Arktos Journal – Arktos Sat, 19 Oct 2019 17:07:04 +0000 en-GB hourly 1 Foundational Elements of Ethnosociology Sat, 19 Oct 2019 17:01:15 +0000 Section One A Brief Excursus into Classical Sociology

The Basic Concepts of Sociology: The General and the Particular

Ethnosociology studies the ethnos with the help of the sociological apparatus, and for that reason we will need the basic concepts of the discipline of Sociology. We shall now make a short excursus into the fundamentals of Sociology.

At the source of an ethnos there always lies myth.

Sociology is a discipline that examines society as a whole preceding its parts, as an organic, not a mechanical phenomenon; it is a discipline that emphasizes the common, or the social, and not the particular, or the individual. Psychology concerns itself with the person. Sociology, on the other hand, studies society as a whole. The fundamental principle of sociology can be summed up thus: the particular derives from the common.

Social Strata and Groups

The fundamental framework of sociological knowledge is two axes, x and y, on which are arranged social strata (x-axis) and social groups (y-axis).

Figure 1. The basic model of sociology.

Of course, Sociology is a well-established scientific discipline. It has many theories, concepts, and methods for the study of society, but the fundamental meaning, scientific paradigm, and episteme of Sociology can be reduced down to this very simple diagram.1

A person’s position with respect to these two axes determines his status. Status consists in a set of roles.

The y-axis, on which strata or classes (understood sociologically) are arranged is called the axis of social stratification. From the sociological point of view, strata are primary in relation to other forms. On the x-axis, social groups are arranged. This is the amalgamation of people by markers of their belonging to a profession, gender, age, geographic area, ethnicity, or administrative position, drawn up in accordance with a non-hierarchical principle. Strata, for their part, imply a hierarchy.

The superimposition of these two axes provides a basic representation of the structure of a society and the place of any unit in it taken for consideration, whether collective or individual. Each social phenomenon, institution, and personality can be resolved into its components through these axes. Such resolution is sociological analysis, the main professional activity of the sociologist.

Sociology operates with the concept of inequality, the quantitative indicator of which is placed along the y-axis. The qualitative indicator is marked on the x-axis: belonging to one or another social group or to a few groups at once.

The strata define a social hierarchy, for which reason the y-axis is vertical. In themselves, groups do not yet say anything about a higher or lower position, which is why the axis on which they are arranged is horizontal. The fact that someone belongs to the group of pensioners, Orthodox Christians, or Muslims in no way makes a pensioner or a Christian higher or lower than one another. Hence groups are arranged horizontally or are at times superimposed on one another. Someone can be a pensioner or a Christian or both one and the other at the same time.

The sociologist studies roles and whether they are played well or not. The question ‘By whom are they played?’ does not interest him.

From the point of view of strata, a person can be either a rich, educated, and famous director, or a subordinate, poor, undereducated, and entirely unknown local. By a certain relativity of approach, society as a whole can be mapped onto this scale of stratification. Sociologists usually distinguish between three main classes: the upper, the middle, and the lower. Membership in each of them is evaluated according to entirely precise criteria: one’s income, number of subordinates, years of education, academic level, and index of citations. A man who has thirty dollars in his pocket and sees a poor person begging might consider himself to be ‘rich,’ but the sociologist will swiftly return him to reality if he asks about his monthly income. The same principle applies to renown: it might seem to someone that he is ‘famous’ if he is known by two or three groups of his peers and he enjoys success among them, but a measurement of the index of citations will put him in his place if it proves that there is no mention of this person among relevant sources.

Metaphor of the Theater

From the point of view of Sociology, man is nothing other than his status or the totality of statuses, a status-set. Contained within the status is a set of roles. The totality of statuses, the carrier of which is the same individual, is a totality of role-sets. For that reason, the metaphor of the theater lies at the basis of the sociological method. In Shakespeare’s words: ‘All of the world’s a stage, / And all the men and women merely players.’ The personal life of the actor does not exist. The actor lives in his roles. These roles can vary. The same actor can play the villain or the hero, a love-struck youth or a greedy loan shark. That which lies beneath the mask, beyond the limits of the stage, normally interests neither the theater, nor the audience, nor the producers.

It is exactly the same thing in Sociology. The sociologist studies roles and whether they are played well or not. The question ‘By whom are they played?’ does not interest him. In any girl, for instance, the sociologist sees an actor and her ability to cope with the roles of beloved, wife, bride, mother, daughter, secretary, future scientist, gymnast, swimmer, cook, etc. In other words, the sociologist sees in a person a set of social statuses.

Figure 2. Status in the sociological coordinate axes.

Man as a Derivative from Society

From a sociological point of view, a person is a derivative of the two axes. The essence of the sociological person is defined depending on where on the diagram we put the dot. In Sociology, status prevails over personal qualities.

The person is derived because, being a set of statuses, he does not himself create it. He takes it over. He is inscribed into it. It is always created by something else.

In Sociology, the person is a product, a result, a detail in an enormous construction. He does not write the drama, nor is he the director. He merely plays roles, which someone else always writes. The person does not build the theater. The theater is unquestionably built: it is called ‘society.’ Sociology does not set before itself the task of discovering the originator of society. This is too abstract and philosophical a question. There is an obvious fact: when we look at history, when we deal with people, we always see society. We come across it everywhere — in archaic, primitive, and highly-developed peoples. Furthermore, society is always built up on collective, super-individual foundations. Everywhere — both in very complex and in very primitive societies — there exist strata and groups.

Who invented society? Sociologists do not know and do not ask this question. Society is absolute. Society always was, and it was always primary in relation to the person. The person is a product of society, a sociological convention. A person outside of society does not exist as a phenomenon. We know a person only as a social person, i.e., as the bearer of social statuses.

Taking this fundamental principle into consideration, we begin to study the ‘ethnos.’

Section Two: Introducing the Concept of ‘Ethnos’

The Etymology of the Word ‘Ethnos’ and its Synonyms

Ethnos (ἔθνος) is a Greek word meaning ‘people,’ along with other Greek synonyms, such as γένος (génos), φυλή (phylé), δῆμος (démos), and λαός (laós), all of which have certain semantic nuances.

Ethnos is another name for the narod, which gradually became a scientific term.2 The Greek word éthnos is close to the Russian word этос (etos), from which the concept of ‘ethics’ is formed. Этос means ‘disposition,’ ‘behavior,’ ‘morality.’ Ethics is a semantic synonym of morals. The archaic Greek root ἔθ (éth-), from which both the words ethnos and ethos are both descended, meant a populated locale, ‘a locale in which villages or settlements are found,’ or ‘rural settlement,’ but not ‘city,’ inasmuch as the city is a πόλις, a polis, from which the term ‘politics’ is derived.

The ethnos creates a spiritual world, all the participants of which dwell in a shared space of meaning.

Thus, in the concept of ethnos there is combined a spatial notion of a populated (rural) country (ἔθ), the concept of ‘disposition,’ ‘morality’ and ‘custom’ (ἔθος) just as it is in the meaning of narod (ethnos). The ethnos is an organic society, located on a defined territory and distinguished by a common morality.

A society can be varied: from the intricate (complex) to the simple (primitive). The ethnos is a simple society, organically (naturally) associated with a territory and bound together by common morality, customs, and symbolic systems.

Definition of the Ethnos

In Russian, the term ‘ethnos’ was introduced into scientific use by Sergei Mikhailovich Shirokogoroff (1887–1939), the great Russian ethnologist, founder of Russian Ethnology, who influenced the Russian historian, ethnologist and Eurasianist Lev Nikolaevich Gumilev (1912–1992).

This is how Shirokogoroff defined an ethnos:

An ethnos is a group of people who (1) Speak the same language, (2) Acknowledge their single origin, (3) Possess a complex of customs, ways of life, and preserved and sanctified by tradition, differing from the customs of other groups.3

The criterion of customs, sanctified by tradition and differing from other groups, very evidently points to the ethos. That is, the presence of specific traditions, customs, and mores comprises one of the main definitions of an ethnos. Thus, a moral basis is one of the essential aspects of an ethnos, which is based on a unity of mores, on the synchronism of moral valuations.

Let us recall Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844–1900) wonderful observation in his book The Genealogy of Morals, wherein he draws attention to the extent to which the mores of different peoples differ from one another.4 For Christian ethnoses there are truths such as ‘love your neighbor’ and ‘do not murder.’ But for the Iranians, for example, the understanding of what is ethical is expressed differently: ‘it is good to shoot with a bow and to speak the truth.’ That is to say: different ethnoses have different ethoses.

In Shirokogoroff’s definition, the complex of customs, way of life, and traditions that characterize a given ethnos necessarily differ from those of other ethnoses. In the very definition of ethnos and ethos there is contained the idea of a plurality of ethnoses and a plurality of ethoses, mores and morals. For that reason, the expression ‘universal ethnos’ is deprived of any sense, since it has nothing to oppose to it. There is no universal ethnos. The ethnos is always concrete.

One can speak of a global socium as an artificial sociological and political construction, but it is not possible to speak of a global ethnos. It is theoretically possible to imagine a socium as something global and universal, but an ethnos is always concrete and particular. At the center of the ethnos, as at the center of morality, there always lies the assertion of a specific system of values.

Unity of language is another qualitative feature of the ethnos. People, speaking one language, living in the same system of signs, senses, and meanings, delineate a specific terrain in the sphere of ideas, mores, psychology, and social relations, which unites them and integrates them along a cultural trait. The ethnos thereby creates a spiritual world, all the participants of which dwell in a shared space of meaning.

There is such a phrase as ‘the Russian world.’ It describes the borders within which communication in the Russian tongue is possible. Language, as Martin Heidegger said, is ‘the house of being.’5 And this house is always ethnic. Language, the commonality of language, constitutes the unity of a common terrain in the sphere of the spirit. It is not important whether this terrain belongs to one or two countries, or whether political or religious borders lie between ethnoses. If people speak and think in one language, then they find themselves in the space of that ethnos to which the language belongs.

Shirokogoroff spoke of the acknowledgement by an ethnos of its single origin. Does a community of people have a single origin or not? From the point of view of sociology and history this is a very difficult question, because almost always peoples, ethnic cultures and traditions turn to the theme of their mythical origins. Plato, for instance, considered himself a descendant of the god Poseidon.

At the source of an ethnos there always lies myth. For instance, Tibetans think that their ancestors were red monkeys and for this reason Tibetans are those who consider themselves descendants of red monkeys.6 Each people has its first-ancestors in culture, and what is important is not whether this ancestor in fact existed or not: nobody knows. Something else is important: how, with what degree of intensity, the ethnos is aware of and experiences its common origin (be it purely mythological). Many who call themselves ethnically ‘Russian’ are representatives of other (most often indigenous) peoples of the Russian Empire, and this ‘Russianness’ forms an ethnos together with the Russian language and a sense of belonging to Russian culture.


1 See Kravchenko, S. A. Sociology: Paradigms and Themes. Moscow: 1997.

2 TN: I often transliterate the Russian term ‘narod’ into English as a technical term.

3 Shirokogoroff, S. M. Ethnos: A Study of the Basic Principles of Change of Ethnic and Ethnographic Phenomena. Shanghai: 1923.

4 Nietzsche, F. Genealogy of Morals. Moscow: Azbuka, 2007.

5 Heidegger, M. Elucidations of Holderlin’s Poetry. SPB: Academic Project, 2003.

6 Kychanov E.I. & Melnichenko, B.I. The History of Tibet from Ancient Times to Today. Moscow: Vost. Lit, 2005.

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On Authority in the Present Day Tue, 15 Oct 2019 12:50:55 +0000 Little less than two weeks ago, two Italian police officers were killed in Trieste, within the very police station where they worked, by a pair of Dominican brothers who had been brought in for questioning.1 Why these brothers were present on Italian soil is not altogether clear; it is known that they had sojourned in Germany, and had subsequently fled, perhaps on account of a car theft. They had been taken into custody in Trieste for the robbery of a scooter, when one of these brothers, one Alejandro Augusto Stephan Meran, requesting the use of the restroom and being accompanied hence by a police officer, evidently made a grab for the officer’s side arm. Somehow seizing the officer’s pistol, he turned this weapon upon the two policemen detaining him and his brother, shooting them a total of seventeen times, before attempting to fire his way out of the police station, leaving several other officers wounded. The gunman and his brother both survived and were taken into custody again.

Far be it from us to suggest that no policeman has ever abused his office; but what is interesting here is the careless presumption of guilt which is brought against any man wearing the uniform.

It would be easy enough to engage here a somewhat facile, but nonetheless quite justified critique of immigration (what in the devil’s name brought these two Dominicans, evidently with a known proclivity to crime,2 halfway across the globe? On what possible grounds were they admitted to the Schengen Zone, and how could they have so easily obtained residency in two European countries? How is it possible that two Italian families have been shattered by foreigners, whose presence here is apparently the latest consequence of our ‘philanthropic’ largesse? And even if we fully cede to this same philanthropy the extraordinary rights it claims for itself in our day – which of course we should not do – would our good philanthropists consider this a reasonable price for their despicable benevolence?). However, we avoid this easy target to address another question which lies somewhat beneath the surface.

The reactions to this event varied predictably, but among the most interesting were those to come from what we might consider the pedestrian, and therefore more reactive and instinctual, representatives of contemporary ‘liberalism’. Many of these responses appeared in comments on various online newspapers or on the social media, and, as is fully unsurprising, they tended to lay the blame for these events squarely on the shoulders, not of the delinquent ingrates, but of the police officers themselves: these officers evidently did not take sufficient precautions to avoid such a grisly outcome; they were evidently not sufficiently prepared for the dangers to which their professions might expose them. As if the Italian Questure were not, and rightly so, considered among the safest places on the whole Italian territory – as if it were commonplace that individuals requisitioned for mere questioning regarding a theft should engage in shooting sprees in retaliation – as if this event were not totally exceptional so far as the law and order of the Italian state is concerned. The most worthless Italian scoundrel would not consider doing something of this kind within a police station, and the very worst of the mafiosi would never be so stupid.

But this aside, our point is quite another. The reaction we have noted here contrasts most starkly with the common reaction made by individuals of precisely the same persuasion whenever a criminal is ‘mistreated’ to the slightest degree, or his ‘dignity’ even slightly offended, by the police. As in practically the whole of the West today, whenever policemen are seen using the least amount of physical force against a presumed criminal, the response of bystanders and commentators inevitably leans toward reprimanding the policemen for ‘brutality’ without even bothering to try to understand the context which might have made their actions necessary. Far be it from us to suggest that no policeman has ever abused his office; but what is interesting here is the careless presumption of guilt which is brought against any man wearing the uniform. In the United States, where ancient racial tensions have begun once more to flare up angrily about the country, the situation has gone so far that many officers fear to use even the most innocuous force in the execution of their duties, even in the interests of self-defence, for fear that this might be lead to their reprimanding, penalizing or even dismissal. This hesitancy on their part puts them, as well as the innocent civilians they are charged to protect, into mortal danger in the many urban areas across the country where violence is the order of the day.

It would be easy for the critics of ‘police brutality’ to retort here that they are so outspoken on this issue because they are concerned with limiting violence as such – that they want a peaceful society, and that any kind of physical aggression is incompatible with civil order. This riposte, however, can hardly be reconciled with the total disproportion standing between the responses to these episodes of ‘police violence’ on the one hand, and to the wanton murder of two men of the law in Trieste, in a police headquarters no less, by immigrants on the other. No time has been wasted, in certain quarters, in prattling about the ‘mental instability’ of the killer, and attempting in every possible way, if not to excuse, at least to attenuate his crime,3 painting him as almost a third victim. Had the roles been reversed, we are certain that the police officer holding the gun would not have been treated with even a fraction of such leniency by this segment of the popular opinion, even if he had acted in unambiguous self-defence. What is more, it must be pointed out that it is precisely the persons who wish to limit the sphere of possible actions open to police officers, who would have exploded in outrage had these two delinquents, for instance, been brought into police headquarters in handcuffs on a mere robbery charge. But our good liberals cannot have things both ways: either our police officers should be invested with the power to use extraordinary force whenever necessary – in which case criminals or even suspected criminals will now and then be hurt or killed – or else they should not be – in which case, it is policemen and innocent bystanders who will be the necessary victims.

Indeed, what is revealed in all of these events, and above all in the ‘liberal’ reaction thereto, is less a distaste for violence than a deeply ingrained detestation of authority. The rule of thumb for such people is simply this: authority is wrong, whatever it does, wherever it stands and in whatever conditions it finds itself. The blame lies always with the powerful.

It is easy enough to see how this kind of attitude was planted deep from the very start of the modern period. The Enlightenment from the very first evinced a keen mistrust of power, identifying power with effete ‘aristocratic’ frivolity, systemic social and political injustices, unaccountable greed and rife corruption. Indeed, few expressions are so simultaneously wholly ridiculous and wholly characteristic of modern times than that ubiquitous bon mot of Lord Acton, to the effect that ‘power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely’.4

It is one of the greater errors of our time to believe that despising authority will eradicate or limit it; to the contrary, opposing it institutionally does nothing but render it more dangerous by driving it underground.

So far as the Enlightenment thinkers were concerned, power wants restriction and ‘balancing’; authority is to be limited, constrained, contained. The French Revolution culminated, not accidentally but in accord with a stringent internal necessity, with the decapitation of countless aristocrats, who were slaughtered regardless of their achievements or their true calibre. The Russian Revolution turned its rage even more broadly against the kulaks, land-owners of comparatively petty rank; in the two centuries from the first great Enlightenment-style revolution to one of the latest, the scent for authority and status, and the hatred against it, had grown hundredfold more acute. We in our peace-loving contemporary West, though ‘revolution’ seems farther from us than Trinidad and Tobago are from London and Paris, have inherited the revolutionary sense where we have not inherited its fury; any ‘progressivist’ today bears the clear signs of the anti-authoritarian strain.

But it is one of the greater errors of our time to believe that despising and mistrusting authority will eradicate or limit it; to the contrary, opposing it mechanistically or institutionally does nothing but render it more dangerous by driving it underground, into the secret snares and pitfalls of the silent, dark, ultra-venomous spiders that live in those musty places. As Vilfredo Pareto teaches with his concept of the ‘circulation of the elites’, one can never eradicate the ruling class, one can only displace it. The contemporary displacement has been of peculiarly obnoxious detriment. In the old ‘opaque’ days of the European aristocracies, in which it was entirely possible for the rulers of European societies to shamelessly keep countless ‘state secrets’ or even ‘family secrets’, power itself was for that very reason transparent and lucid; one knew precisely where to find the centres of power, one could practically put one’s finger on them. One did not always know what the powerful were up to, but one knew with geographical precision where they were enthroned. Today, in our day of unprecedented ‘transparency’, few are the men who even suspect the true seats of power, or who know so much as the names or the faces of the men that sit them; not only the deeds and secrets of the powerful, but even the powerful themselves have become almost invisible to the public’s eye.

Make no mistake, this as a direct result of the modern hatred for authority. Everyone in our contemporary ‘liberal democracies’ is hopelessly and almost fanatically distracted by this grandiose parliamentary puppet-show, featuring its line-up of presentable and more or less charming politicians who, despite all our delusions to the contrary, are neither the most powerful men of their nations, nor the true representative of their peoples, and who take to beating one another like marionettes in public arenas for the entertainment of the common man.

As a most curious ‘externality’ to all of this – to employ a dirty euphemism beloved to our economists – the true ‘power holders’ in our time, who are often enough of so scurrilous a degree of corruption that the most contemptible of Louis XVI’s pampered and powdered courtiers seems a mere harmless dandy by comparison, are not only immune to the generalized mistrust of authority, but even become themselves its unlikely champions and profiteers. It suffices for them to manipulate the press or to perfect their own ‘public relations’, establishing themselves as the friends of the underdog and the opponents of abuses of state; they can even ostensibly turn against the very political classes they themselves have helped create, thereby painting themselves as the friends of democracy and the intransigent enemies of the corrupt political classes – and lo and behold! The people rally around them as around heroes, proclaiming their names as if it were some new Moses come down to us, ready to lead us out of our bondage. And all the while, these clever spiders work in the shadows they have gathered about themselves, ever with the aim of establishing a kind of reverse meritocracy, in which the most ruthlessly capable, the most soulless, the most psychopathic members of our society, are able to rise to influential and affluent positions by compromising themselves in every imaginable respect with each new step along the way.

Modernity is the first historical epoch which has concerned itself more with crippling the powerful than with improving them. The results of this unhappy experiment are by now clarion: our day, which has uncritically accepted Lord Acton’s judgement on power, is perhaps the first epoch in all of human existence to transform that telling error into a near truth.


1The story can be found here in Italian and here in English.

2The shooter had already been arrested in his native state for at least one count of drug trafficking.

3To be sure, the perpetrator was known to have ‘psychological trouble’ of various kinds. This is not the place to enter into questions which needs must touch upon the problem of free will and the justice of punishing the mentally handicapped; for the present it suffices to note that these ‘psychological troubles’ evidently led no one to suspect beforehand that this individual might be incapable of acting responsibly with all the freedoms granted to rational individuals, despite his history of crime in various countries. It is convenient to bring his ‘troubles’ up at this point, after he has launched himself into really hot water; but such groping for extenuating circumstances has about it all the smell of a will to relativize a situation which is clear enough to any man uncorrupted by the necrotic touch of contemporary moralysis. We are pleased to report at least that Matteo Salvini has cut through this nonsense, insisting that non of this should mitigate the murderer’s sentence.

4The implication of this view is that man is inherently made of corruptible material; leaving aside Lord Acton himself, who was probably superior to this statement of his, which he made in passing in a mere letter, it seems to us probable that the idea in question sheds more light on its holder than on human nature as such.

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Why the Environmental Issue is Extremely Serious – Despite Greta Thunberg Wed, 09 Oct 2019 13:07:45 +0000 In times like these, when one is relentlessly bombarded by ever more absurd claims, whether on the non-existence of genders and races, the need for ‘whites’ to compensate for conquests made by their distant ancestors, or the dangers inherent in saying ‘hello’ to a woman, it is not only natural, but absolutely necessary to maintain a sceptical attitude – to use a euphemism – towards the news descending from the echelon of official media or ascending from the chaos of the world wide web. Every thinking person knows that the powers-that-be have taken deception to a scientific level, and that the masses, having lost their character of peoples and become amorphous conglomerates of drifting individuals, are not always capable of critical analysis.

It is no wonder that the sensationalistic approach to the environmental problem is either met with uncritical fanaticism or scorn and derision.

It has become clear that even universities have lost their credibility as providers of independent information, as testified by those professors who lose their tenure or prestige for findings that do not line up with the official narrative that the powers-that-be wish to enforce as the new dogma.

Therefore to feel lost and skeptical in our day is not only understandable, but completely reasonable.

The obvious risk that such an attitude implies is, however, that one may end up disbelieving even the news and facts that are actually true, and downplaying, even ridiculing, information that is in fact of vital importance.

In no field is this more evident than in the environmental issue. The little news that filters through the official media, which is almost invariably about climate change, seems to aim at frightening the masses by conjuring up images of seas swallowing up New York City, or of polar bears desperately clinging to the last scrap of ice.

It is no wonder that such a sensationalistic, theatrical approach to the problem is either met with uncritical fanaticism or scorn and derision. The people who identify as ‘liberal’ usually accept this narrative because it provides them with an additional excuse to attack everything they hate, whether it be ‘patriarchy’ or, more reasonably, imperialism; the people who identify as ‘conservative’ usually reject this narrative because they fear that all of this climate change talk is nothing but a scam on the part of the usual suspects to levy more taxes and exercise more control.

Both approaches, however, happen to be mistaken. Yes, ‘liberals’ are correct in stating that the environmental issue is indeed extremely serious; however, climate change is just one facet of it, and not even the most vital. Yes, ‘conservatives’ are correct in stating that the usual suspects want to exploit climate change for their perceived gains; however that does not mean that climate change is not actually happening.

Let’s look at the facts objectively and disprove both the misconceptions of the ‘liberals’ and those of the ‘conservatives’.

The first necessary observation is that so-called ‘climate change’ is the current obsession of environmentalism. If one had to form an opinion based wholly on the official news, one would inevitably conclude that the CO2 we produce with our industrial activities is the one and only problem facing the planet, and that the obvious solution is to cut emissions and convert to sources of energy that are deceivingly described as ‘green’. The need to cut CO2 emissions has become such a compulsive mantra that any thinking person cannot but wonder what is the real motive behind such ostentatious good will; nor can one help but notice that the profit involved in the conversion to ‘green’ energy is staggeringly enormous, as is the amount of central control that such transition would need in order to succeed. It is no surprise that the techno-financial apparatus is using climate change as a golden opportunity, both to reap huge profits and to march even faster towards global technocratic governance. The vast environmental crisis, which the powers-that-be have chosen to reduce to the picture of rising seas, affords the perfect excuse. Extinction Rebellion, weather it be the creature or the unwitting instrument of the high echelons, seems pushing for some form of directorate that will assume control of energy sources – presumably until the crisis is over, more likely forever. Their plans should be transparent.

The mistake that the less attentive ‘conservative’ commits, however, is to conclude that climate change is therefore a concoction with no real basis, or at most that it cannot be as serious as such hypocritical, corrupt movements would have us believe. This kind of thinking by association rather than by arguments is a feature of the current political and cultural landscape, and is clearly encouraged as a powerful form of mass control.

The unfortunate reality, though, is that climate change seems to be proceeding even faster than what is officially presented. Temperature records keep being broken worldwide, and almost no day goes by without new findings forcing researchers to review previous models, which regularly turn out to be too conservative.

Any scepticism on temperature reporting is understandable yet puerile, when one considers that most of the ice remaining on the North Pole is now one meter thick or less, whereas it used to be two to five meters as recently as 2012. Greenland is melting even during the winter. For the first time in recorded history, this summer the sea off the coast of Alaska was completely ice-free, and local temperatures were higher than in Britain. Antarctica is losing 300 square km of ice every year, and the melting is increasing fast, with deep cracks fracturing glaciers into chunks the size of countries. The fertile area of Australia is getting thinner and thinner, and large numbers of cattle have to be sold or slaughtered for lack of water and forage. Half of the fertile land of Iraq has been lost to drought. In the summer of 2018 Latvia and Lithuania had to declare a state of emergency, France had to shut down four nuclear reactors to avoid overheating rivers, and the Netherlands saw the longest drought ever recorded. This past summer vast portions of the US Midwest were not replanted due to flooding. The list goes on, growing with every passing day, and yet the problem will not seem relevant to the average consumer as long as the supermarket shelves are stocked. The fact that crop yields are decreasing worldwide, also as a consequence of climate change, is unknown to most, and is even explained by some ‘conservatives’ with the bizzarre claim that, while all ice on Earth is melting and there are few glaciers left, a new ice age is approaching.

It is striking to see, in a world where the interconnectivity of the economy is commonplace, how few realize the interconnectivity of living things and habitats on this planet.

The absurdity of such claims should surprise no one, because personal motives determine human thoughts much more than facts do. Rather than facing the daunting challenge of re-organising one’s values and lifestyle, it is clearly much easier to embrace some reassuring but utterly nonsensical fairytale, such as the notion that burning 100 million barrels of oil every day doesn’t make a dent in the heat balance of the planet. Like any drug addict, the modern consumer will claim that the drug is actually good, that the more CO2 the better for the plants, despite experimental science informing us that, past some percentage, CO2 is not beneficial to plant growth at all, and that furthermore an excess of CO2 even diminishes the nutrient content in rice and other crops. Not to mention the damage that the CO2 is causing to the oceans, which have grown by now so acidic that most shellfish can no longer develop properly.

Climate change is therefore a reality, and should actually be designated with a far more effective name, such as ‘planet overheating’.

The mistake that brings together most of both ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’, however, is not what they believe about climate change, but their common failure to consider a whole host of other even more pressing environmental issues, as dire as they are almost unmentioned. Most ‘conservatives’ deny climate change, most ‘liberals’ are fixated with it, both choose to ignore that there is even worse in store.

It is striking to see, in a world where the interconnectivity of the economy is commonplace, how few realize the interconnectivity of living things and habitats on this planet. Modern life certainly removes man from the realities of the natural world, to the extent that many city dwellers have never seen a real hen, let alone a boar, and few stop staring at their phones to observe the workings of an ant.

But even when the complexity and interdependence of the biosphere is to some extent understood, a powerful motive makes any discussion of its ongoing devastation inconvenient: to stop and deal with the devastation we are wreaking would not reap profits for the techno-financial apparatus; it would, on the contrary, force extremely painful decisions. The choice of the powers-that-be is consequently to ignore it altogether, and they are unsurprisingly followed in this by movements like Extinction Rebellion.

Within the limits of this short essay, I will mention just a few facts that barely scratch the surface of our current multiple assaults on the planet. But before I do it is essential to note that we are not discussing predictions; we are rather registering what has already happened. This is not a hypothetical future, it is the actuality of recent and current events.

It is a marvel of the modern age that the sample of issues I am about to mention can be at the same time so evident and so disregarded: an ominous sign of how former humans, by now mostly reduced to consumers, have lost their ability to understand, even to perceive, the world they live in. I am persuaded that some will demand evidence to prove each point; and my response is that if thousands of scientific papers and pieces of news emerging daily, or even the experience of everyday life, have completely escaped the senses and attention of the enquirer, no referral to articles or publications would be helpful. Indeed in a sane world the following list should not surprise anyone, and the sobering fact that it actually does is precisely what spurs my efforts.

1) Chemical, electromagnetic, and radioactive pollution

We keep producing thousands of new chemical compounds that are alien to the natural environment, yet neither producers or consumers seem to wonder where they end up, and what their effects are. Even our sunscreen contains oxybenzone that damages aquatic life, and 750,000 tons of cigarette butts per year introduce 4,000 different toxins into the environment. Thirteen million tons of plastic end up in the oceans every year; in 2018 the Arctic Sea was found to contain 12,000 microplastic particles per litre; 90% of fish birds have plastic in their stomach, and so do the creatures in the Mariana Trench. Fracking pollutes the aquifers, 100 million barrel of fossil fuels are burned every day, and 5G is being implemented regardless of the damage it causes to cell structures.1 No technical solutions are in sight for the Fukushima reactors, which keep releasing tons of radioactive water into the Pacific every day.2

2) Ozone depletion

On the current course, this factor by itself has the potential of terminating life on Earth. Again, no prediction, but fact: the ozone layer is now already so thin that UVC radiation, the last band before X rays, has started to reach the ground.3 If you notice that the sun rays feel particularly hot and piercing on the skin, this is a fact, not an impression. Do you know what is the main cause of ozone depletion? Keep reading.

3) Deforestation and habitat destruction

Never before in history had the development of new infrastructure been as fast and on such a massive scale as in the present. What is left of tropical and boreal forests is being devastated to build new highways, railways, ports, and airports, while the top soil is being eroded or paved over. In June 2018 alone, 1,100 square km of Amazonian forest were cut clear.

Unprecedented fires are ravaging not just the Amazon, Indonesia and central Africa, but even Siberia, Canada, and Alaska.4 The trees that are still alive are burning away, and in many cases they do not regrow. Do you know why? Keep reading.

4) Oxygen decline

The oxygen content has started to decline, both in the oceans and the atmosphere, faster than the rate at which CO2 is increasing. The differential is due to a decrease in forested areas and, above all, plankton mass. The consequences of deoxygenation on humans and life in general are bound to be felt more and more.5

5) Geoengineering

Currently the most destructive factor of all: in our delusional attempt to stop climate change we are intentionally injecting in the atmosphere some twenty million tons of nanoparticulate every year, through the insane global-scale operation whose academic term is ‘geoengineering’ or ‘solar radiation management’. The nanoparticulate used for geoengineering contains light-reflecting aluminium, barium, strontium, and plastic polymers that are contaminating the soil, the water, and the air, causing the die-off of insects and trees, and a dramatic increase in Alzheimer’s, autism, and other neural diseases in humans. The particulate also acts as incendiary dust that makes forest fires more severe and harder to extinguish. Most importantly, it is the major cause of the destruction of the ozone layer.

Our ancestors could notice the tiny movements of distant stars; we fail to realize what’s happening a few miles above our heads.

We see geoengineering in action almost every day when we look up, and are foolishly made believe we are seeing some unusual water vapour that ends up blanketing the whole sky. Our ancestors could notice the tiny movements of distant stars; we fail to realize what’s happening a few miles above our heads. Have you noticed those trails at all, Extinction Rebels? Any thoughts, Greta?

Apparently not. Nor are any other environmental agencies saying a word about geoengineering, or about any of the ongoing assaults on our planet that cannot be turned into profits for the ‘green’ industry. If it were not for the heroism of independent researchers like Dane Wigington, detailed information on geoengineering would not be propagated to the public at all.6

That we should be panicking is therefore certainly true – but certainly not about New York going under water. The few interconnected issues I randomly and inadequately mention above threaten nothing less than decimating life on Earth.7 By the time the sea rises enough to become an issue, most life may already be gone. And no, it’s not just about the photogenic polar bears or the royal penguins, whose main colony has declined 90% since the 1980s. It’s every living things everywhere, from the soil bacteria to the great whales, from the deepest ocean to the garden of your house.

Six billion trees are lost every year, and the ones that survive are mostly dying off. Have you ever stopped to observe the ill-looking leaves and the branches falling off the trees around you? No, it’s not just the trees by the parking lot. Whole forests even in inaccessible areas are essentially already dead although the trunks are still standing.

Over the last fifty years, pelagic fish have declined by 90%, terrestrial fauna over 40%, earthworms 83%, and plankton (the main source of atmospheric oxygen) 40%; we now catch one third of the fish we used to catch in the 1950s, despite going far asea; fisheries are closing down one after another. The ocean dead zones now cover 246,000 square km; most of the coral reef has gone, and toxic algae blooms are becoming widespread from Florida to the Baltic Sea. That the formerly thriving oceans are becoming stratified, oxygen-deprived toxic environments inhospitable to life is a reality experienced and known by fishermen and researchers – not by the average consumer of canned tuna and breaded cod, who is even unaware of eating microplastics along with the fish.

Meanwhile the number of insects has declined 80–90% on the whole planet, including in the few still untouched tropical forests. Have you noticed at all how few insects dirty your windscreen? No, it’s not just insecticides, and definitely not climate change. The bees that are dying by the billions are found to suffer from symptoms similar to Alzheimer’s, in likely connection to the aluminium used for geoengineering.

Not a day goes by without some officially ‘inexplicable’ animal mass die-off, whether it be aquatic mammals getting stranded on beaches, flocks of birds falling from the sky, or cattle dropping dead in the fields. Life is unmistakably being eradicated.

The fact that the average ‘liberal’ believes the official version, obsessing over climate change and sea level rise and explaining everything through that lens, should come as no surprise given the notorious naivety of the self-identified ‘Left’. But the arrogance with which the average ‘conservative’ dismisses not just the reality of climate change, but the whole multi-pronged catastrophe we are inflicting upon ourselves, is somewhat more sobering, when considering that it was historically the self-identified ‘Right’ that instituted the first environmental protections. In contrast, the modern average ‘conservative’ suspects any scientist who sounds the alarm on the ongoing disaster of being a corrupt shill directed by the powers-that-be to spread alarmist propaganda, when the reality is actually the opposite. The already exceedingly conservative studies produced by most scientific institutions are routinely watered down before being presented to the political class and the general audience. The researchers who sound the alarm actually have a hard time being heard. Professor Peter Wadhams, who has spent much of his life in the Arctic, is nowhere near a public figure and media darling. His concerns about the end of ice and his suggestions on how to try and mitigate the problem are equally ignored. Professor emeritus Guy McPherson is routinely ridiculed for his proposition that human extinction may occur in a matter of a decade. The extent to which his calculations are accurate is not the point; what is remarkable is that the average ‘conservative’ perceives such claims as outright scams. He is facilitated in this by the fact that movements like Extinction Rebellion twist the original message of the scientists in the direction favoured by the powers-that-be. Guy McPherson is a case in point: while predicting near-term human extinction, he nonetheless stresses the fact that reducing the burning of fossil fuels, dirty coal in particular, would paradoxically increase global temperatures in a matter of weeks, due to the consequent reduction of the aerosol masking effect, also known as ‘global dimming’. The gist of his message is therefore that we are in a catch-22 situation, with no clear solution in sight. Curiously enough, though, only the short-term extinction part of the message has filtered through to public attention; the part that negates the alleged salvific effect of cutting CO2 emissions is never mentioned. Why is half of his message being withheld? Obviously because converting to ‘green’ energy makes business, whereas acknowledging the complexity of the predicament does not.

Besides relishing the obvious inadequacy, hypocrisy, and opacity of the environmental movements, the average modern ‘conservative’ makes up any sort of ridiculous excuses to avoid facing the evidence of the ongoing devastation.

But of course the average ‘liberal’ unconditionally embraces any simplistic worldview which allows him to scream in public and feel morally superior, while the average ‘conservative’ is all too happy to use such childish fanaticism to prove that environmental claims are politically motivated scams.

Besides relishing the obvious inadequacy, hypocrisy, and opacity of the environmental movements, the average modern ‘conservative’ makes up any sort of ridiculous excuses to avoid facing the evidence of the ongoing devastation. He will point out for example that we still do not know how many species there are, so that it is therefore impossible to establish what percentage is being wiped out. Assertions like this don’t seem to be embarrassed by their lack of connection with reality. By what logic should we assume that the destruction we inflict only affects the species we know, but not the ones yet undiscovered? Do the bombs dropped in a war only kill the people carrying identity cards?

Others ask how such a tiny percentage of CO2 and methane in the atmosphere can cause so much heating, while they apparently never wonder how a minuscule amount of plutonium could kill any number of people. The shocking stupidity of similar remarks makes one wonder whether the dumbing-down side-effect of the aluminium particulate used for geoengineering is already at work.

Even when the ongoing disaster is somehow acknowledged, it is usually argued that it would be impossible or undesirable to give up the comforts of industrialized life – as if it was desirable or even possible to give up the air we breathe or the land that supports plant growth. Worshippers of technology, who abound even among self-described ‘conservatives’, never question their irrational dogma that the technology of tomorrow will remedy the damages caused by the technology of today, despite the historical evidence that damages actually build up and expand, far from self-remedying.

Such loss of wisdom says a lot about the extent to which ‘conservative’ culture has steered away from actual traditional concerns towards the exclusive care for the conservation of one’s bank account.

This obviously represents a detachment from the realism of our ancestors, who knew that the soil they tilled was their ultimate wealth. By what stretch of the imagination, through what kind of self-delusion have we come to assume that we can survive the destruction of life on this planet? What mental disease brings us to regard ourselves as separate from nature, rather than a part of it? We even use the term ‘environment’ as if it was something that surrounds us, rather than the very substance we are made of.

Are we so accustomed and attached to the current techno-financial paradigm that we’ll keep destroying our habitat and ourselves to pursue imaginary numbers?

The answer to this question is, probably so. And it may be too late anyway. But if anything can still be salvaged, it will only happen if we face the dire reality rather than seeking comfort in delusions. It is high time to stop being the pawns of big business, in one way or another; it is high time to look for real facts. Dear ‘liberals’, no ‘green’ energy will save us: we don’t need new ways of repeating the same mistakes. Dear ‘conservatives’, no obstinate denial will save us either: let’s resume the wise habit of conserving that which enables us to live. The environmental issue is deadly serious – despite Greta Thunberg.









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The Meaning of Aristocracy for the Anti-Bourgeois Front – Part 3 Sat, 05 Oct 2019 13:33:35 +0000 The Practical Task

If heredity is a condition and traditions cannot be invented, it would be logical to seek in existing aristocratic lineages at least a part of the elements necessary for the work of which we have spoken above; in this way, the anti-bourgeois struggle could be brought to its terminus. Unfortunately, there are various difficulties with this solution in Italy. The principal of these is to be found in the fact that the Italian nobility was only minimally a feudal nobility. Now, the relation between title and power is the inescapable condition of any true aristocracy. It is necessary to have land, over which one can exercise a kind of partial sovereignty, putting to the test one’s capacities of prestige, of responsibility, of organization and of justice; land is required to love, to protect and to transmit, just as the tradition itself of the name and of the blood; such land is the material basis for the decorum and the independence of a family. This has been the state of affairs but little in Italy. Too many titles of nobility have been conferred in the past, light-heartedly by the ruling houses, as the simple ornaments and instruments of a mundane vanity, if not even as signs of corruption; for whoever has a title but no power or wealth, and who is absorbed by the vanity fair of salons and courts, is ever exposed to the temptation to procure for himself every expedient and means to keep to an artificial and conventional style of life. And it is commonly known to what extent this has facilitated the manoeuvres of Jewish infiltration.

Too many titles of nobility have been conferred in the past, light-heartedly by the ruling houses, as the simple ornaments and instruments of a mundane vanity.

At the same time, there has been no way in Italy to systematically employ a specific noble lineage in the role of a true political class, to constantly place before the nobleman functions and clear tasks which are natural to him, in which he may test his real capacities and impede the stagnation, the depression or the decadence of that which blood and tradition have gifted to the individual. And various other circumstances beyond these have brought it about that the present conditions of the aristocracy, even the Italian aristocracy, are something less than ideal.

Let no one at this point mention the exceptions. We are not speaking of exceptions; even a certain portion of the bourgeoisie could assert its exceptions. We are speaking rather of a visible and homogeneous elite, which bears witness in an unequivocal way to the spirit and the level of a civilization and a society, by representing a tradition in the highest and most spiritual sense of the word. Now, it would be hasty to point to anything that even remotely approaches this within the salons and the circles of our so-called ‘high society’, a milieu in which every kind of creature gathers, every kind of ‘good name’, but, at the same time, also snobbism, internationalism and frivolities of every kind. Let us call things by their proper name: if there is any real antithesis to true nobility, it is constituted precisely by this ‘worldly’ and profane aristocracy, made up as it is by painted matrons and semi-virgins rushing from one tea party to the next, from one flirtation to the next; it is peopled by bridge-players and impeccable executors of the most exotic and ridiculous dances – a true vanity fair of every superficiality, gilded and cosmopolitanized to hide its intellectual vacuity and its spiritual scepticism – even when it opens its doors and invites to its luncheons and its cocktail parties the ‘brilliant’ literati, the novelist of the moment, the laurelled critic, the journalistic pontificator. Where is that hardness, where is that ascesis of power, where is that contempt for vanity proper to aristocracy, back when it was truly a dominant caste? What has become of that ancient Aryan title of the aristocrats, ‘The enemies of gold’? The inbreeding of the international nobility with American girls, as rich as they are stupid and presumptuous, and with the Jewish plutocracy as well, is a well-documented fact and, while it fortunately has not reached among us the dimensions it has in other nations, still, even among us, how many today are not wont to confound superiority with affluence and to welcome in the parvenu who has learned the fashions of the clique and who, by means of the right connections and even of feminine wiles, has been introduced into ‘high society’? And if in certain circles of the so-called ‘black nobility’1 or the like, worldly, cosmopolitan and modernist unscrupulousness has not yet conquered a certain traditionalism, still, in this traditionalism, what really subsists of the true and living traditional spirit, of its strength and its ascetic and heroic intransigence — all of which has nothing to do with conservative conformism, with prejudice, with moralism?

The problem of a new anti-intellectualist, ascetic and heroic aristocracy, almost feudal or barbaric in its hardness and in its refusal to attenuate its forms – an aristocracy which is not improvised, but which legitimates itself with a tradition and with a ‘race’ – is fundamental. By it alone can bourgeois civilization be overcome, not with newspaper articles, but with deeds; by it alone can we arrive at a qualitative articulation of the State beyond totalitarianism, as has been discussed. But this problem is every bit as fundamental as it is arduous to resolve. To what extent can we seek a reawakening and a reintegration of those qualities which have become latent or degenerate in the surviving nobility? To what extent will it be necessary instead to ‘begin anew’, to force ourselves to create the germs of a new nobility – one not defined by individual merits or abilities of the secular and bourgeois sort, but by a superior formation of life, which his to be jealously transmitted to a future posterity?

Where is that hardness, where is that ascesis of power, where is that contempt for vanity proper to aristocracy?

It is certain at least that we must prevent possible confusions, and must do everything in our power to see to it that the dead be divided from the living. The fact that there is a group of people who have the right to carry a noble title only because the Consulta Araldica2 has recognized it to them, and because they live an ‘orderly’ life so far as regards bourgeois conventions and the Penal Code, represents, so far as we are concerned, something lethal to prestige, potency and the possibility of the revival of the true aristocracy. We hold that traditional titles, which serve no end if not inflaming private and worldly vanity – which is to say, artificially clearing a path for that vanity – we hold that these titles are incompatible with the realistic spirit of fascism and, at the same time, that they should be the objects of a clear contempt on the part of whoever is truly aristocratic and desires the aristocracy as a potency and as a reality, not as mere smoke and decorations for the Parisian salons. We hold that a revision, a selection of the nominally heraldic nobility is incumbent. If having a bourgeois soul gives one the right to carry an aristocratic title, it is clear that this title is no longer worth anything, that it no longer signifies anything; it is the instrument, not of distinction, but of confusion.

The test to which the surviving nobility could be put, toward the end of discrimination, would be at bottom easy enough. It is a question of constraining them to not renounce what they are. As in the traditional civilizations, a title, a power and an office must be once more united indissolubly. Whoever has a title and is a man must be excluded from the empty life of the salons, of tea parties, of fashionable hotels and of the ‘high society’; he should be constrained to take up once more that which belonged to his fathers – if his nobility is true – and which he, in the modern world, has cheerfully renounced so as to degrade himself in the worldly life: with his title, he should be constrained to assume a charge and a power, an absolute responsibility, and to do this with the understanding that it must be natural for him to give to an extent that would be exceptional and unnatural for others. Only should he pass this test could his title be confirmed and come to mean anything.

It matters not if in this trial by fire many will fail. That will do nothing but good for the aristocracy. Indeed, this is the unique condition by which the aristocracy will be able to rise again, selected and dominant, offering precious elements for integrating the political hierarchy of the new State with a kind of New Order, whose efficacy is derived from its qualities and its lofty interior bearing. Without the emergence of this Order, it will be difficult to supply its absence with surrogates, and the present confusion will persist: there will be an aristocracy of the spirit which is not that of class, not the patrician aristocracy, and there will be a patrician and heraldic aristocracy consisting of the marginal survival of a true aristocracy of isolated individuals, all wavering amidst the fog of bourgeois imitations of elitism. The hard, Roman construction of the new State, especially if it should be put to the test of a grand new heroic experience, is destined to swiftly rise above this fog.


1Italian, nobiltà nera. Reference to the nobility which maintained their faith with the Pope when the Savoys conquered the Papal States in 1870. The term referred to the fact that these nobles kept the doors of their palaces closed, to denote the Pope’s self-imposed confinement. The term remained in use even after these events to denote that portion of the Italian nobility which maintained a more or less traditionalist Catholic attitude. In more recent decades, some of them threw their support behind Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre, founder of the anti-Vatican II fraternity, the Society of Saint Pius X. —Trans.

2The ‘College of Arms’, established in 1869 to advise the newly united Italian government on matters relating to heraldry, nobility etc. —Trans.

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The Meaning of Aristocracy for the Anti-Bourgeois Front – Part 2 Tue, 01 Oct 2019 13:26:34 +0000 Prestige and ‘Race’

At this point, it can be seen that with our last considerations we have only apparently left behind our initial subject — which is to say, the problem of the significance of aristocracy. Indeed, it is evident that one cannot contemplate a new Traditional and organic articulation of the State without setting before oneself the problem of persons, in a still higher sense than that implied by the conventional term, or by the nineteenth-century tastes of the ‘political ruling class’. And this idea grows clearer yet if only one bears in mind that we are not speaking only of ‘political’ functions and activities which are more or less connected to the administrative or legislative body of the State. We are rather speaking of the problem of a personal form of authority, which issues from the man rather than his office: we are speaking of a prestige and an example which, being common to a given class, needs must form an atmosphere, crystallize a higher style of life, and thus effectively give the ‘tone’ to a new society. We are speaking almost of an Order, not in the religious sense, but in the ascetic-warrior sense, and naturally with reference to what this might represent in the world, as in the Ghibelline Middle Ages. Indeed, we have in mind even the most ancient Aryan and Indo-Aryan societies, in which it is known that the elite was not in any way materially organized, nor drew its authority from representing any given tangible power, but still solidly maintained its rank and gave the tone to the corresponding society.

We are speaking of the problem of a personal form of authority, which issues from the man rather than his office: we are speaking of a prestige and an example which effectively give the ‘tone’ to a new society.

Now, it seems clear enough that it is precisely in these terms that any ‘aristocracy’ must be conceived, which is invoked against the ‘bourgeois’ type of society and civilization. This concerns neither an ‘aristocracy of thought’, nor the velleities of the ‘intellectuals’, nor the little popular ‘tribunals’, such as are aimed at manipulating and enthralling the masses with expedients dictated by the moment: we are speaking rather of an ‘aristocracy’ which undeniably has many traits in common with the gentile nobility, with the traditional patriciate, and, we almost want to say, with the ancient feudal and warrior-sacral aristocracy of Aryan societies. In this way a new problem emerges: that of examining the valid elements of ‘style’ within this higher aristocracy, as well as determining how to evaluate those who, according to their heraldry, are ‘nobles’ — for the nobility yet exists in Italy, and indeed fascism has concerned itself with protecting and controlling its titles, and raising new persons to its dignity.

Traditionally, two things above all stand out in the nobility: the value recognized to blood and the subordination of the person to a given lineage and origin. Individualistically or ‘humanistically’, the single human being has no value here; he is worth something in relation to his blood, to his origins and to his family, whose name, honour and faith he must exalt. In the same way, relevance is given to his heredity and to his origin, to the point of excluding any contaminating intermixing. The relations of this attitude to racism are starkly evident.

Traditionally, two things above all stand out in the nobility: the value recognized to blood and the subordination of the person to a given lineage and origin.

For thousands of years racism has been active in the gentile nobility of every people, and even in its highest form, insofar as it has maintained its adherence to the idea of tradition and avoided materializing in the form of a kind of zoology. Before the concept of race was generalized, as it has been in current times, having race was always synonymous with aristocracy. The qualities of race always signified the qualities of the elite, and referred not to gifts of genius, of culture or of intellect, but essentially to character and to style of life. They stood in opposition to the quality of the common man because they appeared, to a large degree, innate: either one has the qualities of race or one does not have them. They cannot be created, built, improvised or learned. The aristocrat, in this regard, is the precise contrary of the parvenu, the late-comer, the ‘self-made man’, who has become that which he was not. To the bourgeois ideal of ‘culture’ and of ‘progress’ is opposed the aristocratic ideal, which is conservative of tradition and of blood. This is a fundamental point, and is the single true overcoming of all bourgeois and Protestant surrogates for aristocracy.

From the point of view of patrician racism, not only physical qualities but also spiritual elements are transmitted hereditarily — a special moral sensibility, a vision of life, an instinctive faculty of discrimination. All of this is of fundamental importance for new tasks, as well. Here we are speaking of specific gifts which, in the last analysis, derive from superbiological factors of character, factors which are fatally dispersed in the masses. A typical aristocratic trait is the faculty of reacting from out of spiritual motivations, and doing so in as instinctive, direct and organic a way as the common man is capable of doing only with regard to that which closely touches upon his animal or passional life. Moreover — and this is important — in authentic aristocracy the meaning of ‘spirituality’ has always had little to do with the modern notion: there is the sense here of sovereignty, there is contempt for profane things, common things, things up for sale — things such as are born from ability, ingenuity, erudition and even genius — a contempt which is not so distant to that professed by the ascetic himself.

Indeed, we are tempted to express the secret of true noble gifts in this formula: a superiority with respect to a life which has become natural, a life of pedigree. This superiority, which has about it something of the ascetic, does not create antitheses within the very being of the aristocratic type; as a second nature, it stands above the inferior human part of his being and calmly permeates it; it translates into imperious dignity, strength, a ‘line’, a calm and controlled bearing of soul, of word, of gesture. It gives place to a higher human type. By guiding the present theory of race to its logical consequences; by completing it with the consideration of those virile and ascetic values, which play so large a role in fascism; by recognizing the fundamental inequality of beings, which is not restricted to the races, but concerns also individuals of one and the same race; by confronting therefore the selective and protective tasks that derive therefrom — by doing all of this, one cannot help but be led back, sooner or later, to this human ideal of the aristocratic tradition. But here the great problem poses itself, of the paths and the basis for practical realization in these matters.

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On So-Called ‘Palingenetic Ultra-Nationalism’ – Part 2 Thu, 26 Sep 2019 15:36:32 +0000 Palingenetic Ultra-Nationalism

Fascism is a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism.1

The above is Roger Griffin’s ‘formula’ for Fascism. This is gate-keeping par excellence, and the perfect tool to use against a public that does not approve of the direction their country is going in: ‘You are opposed to cosmopolitanism? Or to the presence of religions that seek to destroy your way of life [and are, as Christopher Hitchens said multiple times, more of a threat to people on the Left than anyone else]? You fascist!’

The only way the Right can really oppose the weaponization of the term ‘Fascist’ is though humour.

You don’t even have to be on the Right at all to have this weapon used against you. By the logic of the modern far-Left, communists in the early twentieth century would be considered Fascists, as professor Paul Gottfried observes:

The older socialist orientation did not predispose its adherents toward or seek to promote open borders, free trade, sexual self-expressiveness, and the submergence of the dominant Western culture into the flux of incoming ethnic minorities. Multitudinous facts and sources indicate that working-class socialists generally opposed immigration (American unions were vocally active in supporting the Immigration Act of 1921), favored protectionism, and had no special affinity for multicultural politics.2

It is worth noting that a lot of people seem to believe that the Marxists abandoned defence of the working class in favour of ‘social justice’ upon realising the failures of the Soviet Regime. Here we must disagree. Social justice ideas already existed in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engel’s writings. Granted, as many people are aware, Marx’s writings on race and on his fellow Jews are very much opposed to ideas of the modern Left. It is more of a shift on emphasis that occurred – followed by a shift from reality to insanity.

But I digress. Let’s ‘deconstruct’ Griffith’s formula above:


This term simply means ‘rebirth’. It signifies the idea of aspiring for a national rebirth, like a phoenix rising out of the ashes.

Mythic core:

[T]he vision of the (perceived crisis of the nation as betokening the birth-pangs of a new order. It crystallizes in the image of a national community, once purged and rejuvenated, rising phoenix-like from the ashes of a morally bankrupt state system and the decadent culture associated with it.3

I must ask, Dr. Griffith: is the Left not gripped by precisely this same attitude whenever the Right is in power? Are traditional values not precisely a ‘morally bankrupt system’ so far as the Left is concerned?

Bear in mind that the word ‘myth’ itself does not just mean ‘mythology’, like that of King Arthur, Perseus and so forth. The way Marxists view figures like Lenin or Trotsky is itself mythological. As mythology is commonly defined in academia: “‘Myth is ideology in narrative form.4

The interesting thing about how Roger Griffin defines ‘mythic core’ is that he seems to take issue with how the idea of a national community is presented in a sort of romantic form. Nationalism itself, and not just Fascism, romanticises the nation. He talks about the ‘Nazis’ cry of “Germany Awake”, the British Union of Fascists’ campaign for a “Greater Britain”’ – yet this isn’t something unique to Fascism at all, and these ‘academics’ know it. Griffin should just be honest and speak his mind.


What is the separation between ‘liberal’ and Marxist ‘Fascist studies’? ‘Liberals’ will use the terms ‘ultra-nationalism’ and ‘nationalism’ and pretend they are talking about two different phenomena; Marxists will at least be honest and state that they oppose nationalism as such.

Ultra-nationalism is (apparently) an extreme devotion to your own nation; you put your nation above others. (And why wouldn’t you? Why would you want your nation to ‘better’ other nations? Where you live should be of primary importance to you; why should we assist any other nation that does not reciprocate the help that we give them? Why should any nation take on the responsibility of a dependent nation, how does making another nation entirely reliant on us help them in the first place?)

On page seven, Griffin states: ‘By its nature fascism is racist, since all ultra-nationalisms are racist in their celebration of the alleged virtues and greatness of an organically conceived nation or culture.’ But then he immediately continues with:

However, fascist ultra-nationalism does not necessarily involve biological or Social Darwinism concepts of race leading to eugenics, euthanasia, and attempted genocide. Nor does it necessarily involve anti-Semitism, or hatred directed against any particular group perceived as culturally or genetically different.

Fascism is by nature racist because people celebrate their race’s success, but fascism does not have to be racist either? What does he mean? He doesn’t mean anything at all by this; he is leaving a void to ensnare anyone who happens to be a nationalist, but who at the same time does not deny the existence of race. So, if you are a professor of biology and you are Right-wing, I am sorry to inform you, but you are a fascist.


This is a term we are very familiar with at present; we hear it ad nauseam, mostly with negative connotations. As put by Alain de Benoist in is essay What is Populism:5

It has become a political insult or a failure for the views of its opponents, accused of awakening the dangerous inclinations of the working classes and used by the ruling classes to stigmatize those who reproach them for having annexed power for their exclusive use.

Thus, a populist politician is someone who is accused of ‘pandering to the masses’ – or to put it truthfully, it is a politician who bases their policies on what the public actually want instead of what corporations, academia and inner-city dwellers want. Oh, what a terrible thought! Imagine actually being a democratic politician in a ‘democratic’ country!

We saw the perfect example of this [anti-populist rhetoric] in June 2016 after the decision of the British people to leave the European Union. […] Bernard-Henri Lévy saw in Brexit the ‘victory of the most rancid for of sovereignty and the most idiotic form of nationalism’, Jacques Attali saw the ‘dictatorship of populism’, Alain Minc the victory ‘of ill-educated people over the well-educated’. All of them [wondered what could be done to overturn the vote]. Some said it was not necessary to consult people, who know nothing about the issue and will say whatever. Others say our priority is to stop this from happening again at any cost.

This last sentence is the most concerning. The media, academia and so forth tell the public the ‘populism’ is a dirty term. The general public rely on ‘authoritative sources’ to inform them; they do not desire and/or have the time to look into every single issue, to study politics, philosophy, anthropology, sociology, etc. and therefore to understand exactly how badly they are being hoodwinked and manipulated by those in charge of what the spectacle forces into their minds. A few more points from Alain de Benoist are worth quoting before we continue:

[S]ome people, such as international lawyer Larent Cohen-Tanungi, simply propose banning referenda in the European Treaties. Others argue that certain issues be protected from the popular vote as a matter of principle, and that the ‘majority level’ be increased to 60 percent (why not 90 percent?). Jean Claude-Juncker had already said: ‘There can be no democratic choice against the European treaties!’

Naturally, because the working-classes tend to vote for more nationalist policies, most elites equate the working-classes with the ‘less-educated’ and dangerous masses, who shouldn’t be allowed to decide for themselves:

This same argument has been used against those who voted for ‘Brexit, while in the United States, Donald Trump also achieved his best results amongst those with fewer qualifications. Whereas, in the 1950s and 60s, nobody reproached Communists Party voters for lacking in qualifications, now it is implied that a lack of education automatically makes one receptive to simplistic and harmful ideas. Higher study becomes a guarantee of a predisposition to adhere to the right ideas – which is laughable. We might just as well argue that the least educated are also the least conditioned by the dominant ideology, and that the more cultivated people are in reality the most inclined to parrot fashionable mantras and the identify with social conformism.

It is definitely easy to denounce the ‘fears’ that are said to feed populism, and particularly the people who ‘manipulate’ these fears, but we would do better to ask ourselves about their causes and their foundations.

As true as this final statement is, elites like Roger Griffin will merely say that these causes and their foundations are populists. If you reply to these elites with, ‘Well, no, populists play to an existing fear, they do not create the fear’, they will then reply (if you catch them in a rare moment of candour, at least) that ‘The public are just seeing things, they are sheep that need to be herded by the “better educated” who are superior to those who actually live in problematic areas, as opposed to people like myself, in our nice safe gated communities, wandering aimlessly in a fantasy land far from the working-class.”


The only way the Right (and I am speaking to the entire Right, not just a portion that agrees with me, but anyone and everyone who considers themselves Right-wing) can really oppose the weaponization of the term ‘Fascist’ is though humour. While the term still has its power there will be no successful Right-wing movement. Marxism will continue to permeate the West regardless of whether or not any existing Right-wing party is in power. The Marxists’ hold on academia will allow the continued indoctrination of Marxist views into each generation.

While the term ‘Fascist’ still has its power there will be no successful Right-wing movement.

The public at large, who are not engaged in politics, will continue to fear expressing their opposition to the changes occurring around them; they will fear that this term will be used against them. No action will be made by these people until a crisis point is reached and each one of them is individually impacted by whatever events lie in the future. That is how the West has become, with most people staring blankly at screens, watching TV shows and movies, numbing themselves with an assortment of medications they do not really need – prescribed to the public on order, so as to keep them subservient, unhappy perhaps with what is occurring, yet doped up enough to prevent them from thinking dangerous things like, ‘Maybe change is possible’. The only thing that will startle these people is something occurring directly to them. Videos on screens of what is occurring is never really enough – not unless it is something enormous. What we see on the screen is different to what we see in front of us; what happens in front of us is an Event in our individual world, while what we see on the screen is an Event away from us.

If we can end that fearful element in the public, that almost neurotic fear of the word Fascist, then that would mean the removal of an enormous barrier to change, to actual action.


1Griffin, Roger, Fascism (UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), 4.

2Gottfried, Paul, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt: Towards a Secular Theocracy (USA) University of Missouri Press, 2002), 30.

3Griffin, Roger, Fascism (UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), 3.

4Lincoln, Bruce. ‘An Early Moment in the Discourse of ‘Terrorism: Reflections on a Tale from Marco Polo’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 48/2, 242–259.

5de Benoist, Alain, The Telos Essays (USA: Telos Press, 2018), 334–358.

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On So-Called ‘Palingenetic Ultra-Nationalism’ – Part 1 Wed, 25 Sep 2019 15:53:21 +0000 Introduction

As more and more of the public are falsely labelled ‘Fascist’ by people with no understanding of the term, those who purport to be experts on Fascism should be engaged, more now then ever, in doing what they can to put an end to this misuse. Roger Griffin, one of the most notable academics in the area of Fascism, has ‘attempted’ to do so. However, as I will be arguing here, his attempts are absolutely empty: his work itself is what contributes to the term’s misuse in the first place.

The main problem we will be focusing on here is Roger Griffin’s famous ‘formula’:

Fascism is a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism.1 1

We will deconstruct this formula in the second part of this essay. But first, we will go over three key texts by Griffin to discuss the following:

  1. His hypocrisy when it comes to misusing the term, employing his treatment of Alain de Benoist and Julius Evola as examples;
  2. Further hypocrisy in regard to Griffin’s claiming that Marxists have contributed to the misuse of the term, even while he himself advocates synthesising apparent ‘liberal’ interpretations with Marxist ones; and
  3. How defining Fascism as something in opposition to liberalism and Marxism has become a way of preventing any new ideologies from entering the public square.

Part 1


Roger Griffin’s first book on the subject of Fascism was The Nature of Fascism. In the first few pages Griffin acknowledges that the term is abused and misused, and even highlights this misuse, rampant in academia:

What makes a book like this potentially ‘relevant’ as a contribution to the human sciences, however, is that the word has suffered an unacceptable loss of precision within academic circles as well.2

Further down the page he then lays some of the blame for the ‘eroding’ of ‘fascism’s lexical value’ upon ‘Marxist theoreticians’3 (I am not sure why he felt the need to add the qualifier ‘Marxist’ here; anyone who has been to university knows they are one and the same thing). The problem here is that Roger Griffin is aware of this misuse, and he appears to oppose it (he even stated directly to VOX in an interview that Trump does not meet the criteria of Fascism)4 but, as we will show, the very way he defines Fascism is what allows this to occur.

He is correct to note that Marxists have played a large role in ‘deciding’ what is and is not Fascism; universities laden with Marxist professors have been allowed to manipulate the term for decades, making it encompass anyone who opposes their ideas. But Griffin has been no different in his approach. In determining his ‘Fascist minimum’ he has left the doors wide open for accusations to continue unabated, even while he simultaneously trying to tell the public to stop misusing the term. He even goes as far to throw a few people into the fire-pit himself, like Alain de Benoist and Julius Evola. In his section ‘What is Proto-Fascism?’ in The Nature of Fascism he writes:

These ‘literary fascists’ (for example, Papini, Drieu la Rochelle, Evola, Alain de Benoist) could be considered proto-fascists in terms of their obvious elitism and indirect impact on events, but when (in the case of all four figures) their works are used indirectly to legitimate fascist activism it is clear that they are still and integral part of the fascist phenomenon.5

So, by virtue of the fact that their texts have influenced Fascism, (‘indirect impact on events’ is a reference to Thomas Sheehan’s text Myth and Violence: The Fascism of Julius Evola and Alain de Benoist)6 they are proto-Fascists? Why is this same guilt-by-association not ‘evenly distributed’ to other ideologies and ideologues? Where is the egalitarianism?

Evola and de Benoist are mentioned a fair few times by Griffin in his work on Fascism; let’s look at a few more examples before we sort out this particular falsehood:

It should be stressed that, though worlds apart in terms of their metaphysical premises, what both Evola and de Benoist have in common is that both offer total world-views which diagnose the alleged decadence of the present age and offer the prospect of supra-individual salvation in a new age where excellence, national uniqueness, and cultural distinctiveness are paramount. This indirectly provides convoluted rationales for the mentality which breeds apartheid, anti-liberalism and anti-communism, leading (especially in Italy) to acts of terrorist violence against alleged sources of decay. In other words, the old wine of palingenetic ultra-nationalist myth has been poured into new bottles, the label originally marked ‘Aryan’ being covered with one marked ‘Indo-European’ or ‘Traditional’. … They also play a major role in the internationalization of fascism. … The outlet for GRECE ideas in Germany is the Thule Seminar, a great nephew of the Thule Society which has such a formative influence on the (NS)DAP.7 7

Anyone who is familiar with the work of de Benoist and Evola will have noticed the glaring errors here (and probably chuckled along the way).

Evola was in no way shape or form a nationalist or Fascist. The mere fact that he had to flee Fascist Italy over his anti-Fascist writing attests to that. He was never even a member of the Fascist party, he stated ad nauseam that he saw in Fascism (and Nazism) a vehicle for his own ideas – his own ideas being of a spiritual order. Evola was opposed to the secular element of Fascism – an aspect of the regime which Griffin himself highlights:

Both Fascism and Nazism as regimes were characterised by the centrality of the leader cult, the celebration of public over private space and time, and the constant attempt to use social engineering to regiment people into organisations with an ethos of activism and enthusiasm. … [They thus lacked] a genuine metaphysical dimension and [were] the utter anthesis and destroyer of all genuine religious faith.8

This was written by Roger Griffin, yet it sounds exactly like Evola. The basis of Evola’s work is in spirituality and religion. It also rests on opposition to modernity, while Fascism and Nazism are based in the idea of a New Man and a new system in opposition to ideas advocated by Evola, such as ‘an absolutist system in which sovereignty is invested in a hereditary monarchy.’9

There are innumerable statements made by Evola that academia could focus on, yet scholars overwhelmingly focus on his links to Fascism. I find this extremely telling. The body of Evola’s work is religious in nature; when he writes on politics, his words are overwhelmingly negative, because he believes society should be built on transcendental principles; yet this is entirely antithetical to what academia writes. They are so bound up in materialistic thinking that they cannot even objectively view Evola’s work to see that he is approaching the world from the point of view of transcendence.

As for de Benoist, we are speaking of a genuine intellectual who has written numerous times against both Nazism and Communism (including in a text called Nazism & Communism, which has yet to be translated into English, though Telos released an equivalent essay by de Benoist in English, called ‘Nazism and Communism: Evil Twins’).10 His criticism of liberal democracy does not stand in opposition to democracy as such, but is rather a criticism of its lack of public participation:

Democracy is a ‘-cracy’, which is to say a form of political power, whereas liberalism is an ideology for the limitation of all political power. Democracy is based on popular sovereignty; liberalism, on the rights of the individual. Liberal representative democracy implies the delegation of sovereignty, which strictly speaking – as Rousseau had realised – is tantamount to abdication by the people.11

The key notion for democracy is not numbers, suffrage, elections or representation, but participation … it is not institutions that make democracy, but rather the people’s participation in institutions. The maximum of democracy coincides not with the ‘maximum of liberty’ or the ‘maximum of equality’, but with the maximum of participation.12

Roger Griffin stated in his aforementioned interview with VOX that

As long as Trump does not advocate the abolition of America’s democratic institutions, and their replacement by some sort of post-liberal new order, he’s not technically a fascist.13

If Alain de Benoist wants an actual democracy with more citizen participation, then how exactly can he be placed within the realm of Fascism/proto-Fascism (Griffin seems to not be overly concerned with consistently using this labels)?

The two examples above lead us to the answer.


The overbearing focus on the ‘defining’ of Fascism is directed at placing it in opposition to something. As stated above, much of the determination of what Fascism is comes from Marxism. In Griffin’s most recent book on Fascism released in 2018,14 in the first chapter he celebrates the potential of bringing together ‘liberal’ and Marxist interpretations of Fascism:

It is also worth mentioning the contributions by socialists of different hues to the debate on the possibility of reconciliation of Marxist and ‘liberal’ positions of fascism hosted by the special issue of European Journal of Political Theory (Roberts and Griffin 2012), which produced stimulating critiques of the limitations placed on the application of the term by ‘liberal’ orthodoxy.15

This shows how useless academic ‘research’ into Fascism is. Pray tell, how can one arrive at an unbiased ‘definition’ if this involves Marxists who have spent close to a century now defining Fascism as anything opposing their own doctrine, opposing Marxism?

Opposition is indeed the key-word here. So many of the attempts to define Fascism centre around stating ‘a Fascist is someone who opposes X’. Here are three of the features of ‘generic fascism’ which Roger Griffin lists in his Oxford Readers text from 1995:16

1. Fascism is anti-liberal.

2. Fascism is anti-conservative.

4. Fascism is anti-rational.

Amongst the ten points given you will of course encounter tonnes of remarks, stating that Fascism is: anti-cosmopolitan, anti-parliamentary democracy, anti-tolerance, anti-individuality, anti-open-society, anti-one-worldism, anti-communism, etc.

The interesting part here is the careful placement of anti-cosmopolitanism under point 8, ‘Fascist racism’:

Fascism is also intrinsically anti-cosmopolitan, axiomatically rejecting as decadent the liberal vision of a multi-cultural, multi-religious, multi-racial society. However, this does not necessarily lead to the call for other races to be persecuted per se but may express itself ‘merely’ in a campaign for propaganda and violence against their presence as ‘immigrants’ who have abandoned their ‘natural’ homeland.17

What kind of scholarship fails to recognize the difference between race and religion?

The placing of so-called ‘Fascism’ in opposition to liberal views is what allows liberal thinkers to utilise the term as a weapon. If you are opposed to egalitarianism there is no argument to be had, you have been placed within the ‘Fascism minimum’. You can state your argument as to why you are opposed to egalitarianism or mass immigration – as I have done in university classrooms on numerous occasions – but you are just making white noise.

This strategy has had a wider effect than just in academia, however. When you ask most people to explain what a Fascist is, they will immediately state that ‘a Fascist is someone opposed to X, Y and Z’. This strategy of considering Fascism as merely something contrary to Marxism is also advantageous to capitalists; it effectively prevents the possibility of a new idea emerging to replace the two dominant economic systems of thought. Our ability to generate new ideas is stagnated by this economic tribalism.

That said, it is worth pointing out another interesting point here. Some Marxists have been equating capitalism and Fascism for quite a while, as Roger Griffin has noted in his work.18 This strategy of linking the two has really gained ground since Donald Trump started on his first election campaign. (Of course, the reaction by neoconservatives found in ‘Prager University’ videos has been to point the finger back at Marxists, claiming that Fascist economic systems are socialist in character. This is very reminiscent of two children putting the blame on each other: “No, he did it!”) If we continue off of Griffin’s most recent text, mentioned above, we can clearly see that there are really only two camps in ‘Fascist studies’: the ‘liberal’ camp that Roger Griffin places himself in, and the Marxist camp. Griffin then reveals to us that these two are essentially converging into one in any case (I doubt there is really as much separation in the first place given the state of ‘academia’):

More recently, fresh analyses by anglophone Marxists have been advanced on fascism which also avoid simplistic equations of bourgeois reaction, capitalism and fascism, such as Neocleous (1997) and Woodley (2009). Apart from offering a sophisticated left-wing ‘take’ on fascism, Woodley offers a comprehensive study of the tangled history of Marxist engagement with the ideological dynamics of fascism. It is also worth mentioning the contributions by socialists of different hues to the debate on the possibility of reconciliation of Marxist and ‘liberal’ positions of fascism hosted by the special issue of European Journal of Political Theory (Roberts and Griffin 2012), which produced stimulating critiques of the limitations placed on the application of the term by ‘liberal’ orthodoxy (e.g. Yannielli 2012). Roger Markwick’s discussion of communism’s relationship to fascism (2009) is another example of how a left-wing perspective on interwar history can enrich comparative fascist studies for all concerned.19

I will close this first part of my essay with some final remarks:

  1. With regard to Griffin’s apparent opposition to the term’s misuse, either he is genuine (in which case he is really just agitated that the term isn’t being used in the way he wants it to be used), or he is lying (so as to try and distance himself from any potential fallout).
  2. The definition of Fascism performs a kind of gate-keeping role, as it allows the Left to continue to weaponize the term. Marxists and ‘liberals’ are allowed to define Marxism and Fascism as they will, in order to keep the culture war between these two groups going and to prevent the possibility of any new ideology from rising. Hence the reason they maintain their definition of Fascism as something that is opposed to liberalism and Marxism. Liberalism and Marxism are given the status of positives, thus qualifying anything that lies outside of them as a negative. This makes them perfectly immune to all critique. We can see this in the example above of Alain de Benoist. Alain de Benoist holds contrary positions; in the literature on him and the Nouvelle Droite more generally by academics, you will therefore always see the focus directed at ‘Alain de Benoist opposes X, Y and Z’, while they will rarely focus on the reasons that he opposes these things. ‘Benoist opposes democracy’ – but as shown above, he opposes liberal democracy in favour of direct democracy. They use language in a very precise and intricate way to make anyone arguing against them look devious and evil, and they de-platform dissidents so they can manipulate our ideas by projecting them to the public in such a way that they appear to be something they are not.
  3. We must reread Nietzsche. I do not mean just for the joy of it; we must focus on his aphorisms. Learn how to convey your ideas in short, precise ways to impede their misrepresentation. This will also help in spreading them, as a wall of sharp little arrows descending onto the flies in the marketplace, startling the herd, distracting them from the spectacle, and renewing their awareness of the world around them and just how dark it truly is.


1Griffin, Roger, Fascism (UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), 4.

2Griffin, Roger, The Nature of Fascism (UK: Pinter Publishers London, 1992), 2.


4See the article by Dylan Matthews, updated May 19, 2016.

5Griffin, Roger, The Nature of Fascism (UK: Pinter Publishers London, 1992), 51.

6Thomas Sheehan, ‘Myth and Violence: The Fascism of Julius Evola and Alain de Benoist’, Social Research, 48/, (1981), 45–73.

7Griffin, Roger, The Nature of Fascism (UK: Pinter Publishers London, 1992), 169.

8Griffin, Roger, Fascism (UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), 5.

9Ibid, 4.

10Benoist, Alain de, ‘Nazism and Communism: Evil Twins’, Telos, Summer 1998, 178-192.

11Benoist, Alain de, The Problem of Democracy (Arktos Media Ltd., 2011), x.


13Matthews, article updated May 19, 2016.

14Griffin, Roger, Fascism (USA: Polity Press, 2018).

15Ibid, 23.

16Griffin, Roger, Fascism (UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), 4–12.

17Ibid, 7–8.

18See Fascism (2018), Chapter 2: ‘Making Sense of Fascism: Marxist and Early Liberal Approaches’: ‘This class analysis set the tone for the vast outpouring of socialist, and especially Marxist, analyses of fascism that continue to this day, all of which assume the axiomatically capitalist nature of fascism, whether (at the very most) counter-revolutionary and partially autonomous or (at the very least) arch-reactionary and controlled by the bourgeoisie.’

19Griffin, Roger, Fascism (USA: Polity Press, 2018), 24.

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The Meaning of Aristocracy for the Anti-Bourgeois Front – Part 1 Fri, 20 Sep 2019 15:15:36 +0000 Those consequences into which the recent and well-known anti-bourgeois polemic, in its more serious aspects, has led us, can more or less be summed up as follows. Bourgeois civilization and spirit, being as it is incompatible with fascism, must be overcome. There are however two ways of being anti-bourgeois, of desiring the end of the bourgeoisie, and these are not only different, but even antithetical to one another. In the first, the bourgeoisie, along with all of its derivatives – bourgeois ethics, bourgeois culture, plutocracy, capitalism, etc. – must give way to a popular regime of the masses: the ‘social’ or ‘collectivist’ era must be affirmed over and above the bourgeois. From the other point of view, the true overcoming of the bourgeois lies instead in aristocracy. A new aristocratic epoch is what must be affirmed, beyond the bourgeois decadence of Western Civilization.

The phenomena of totalitarianism and of statal concentration has various meanings, indeed contrary meanings, according to the type of regime which preceded it.

It is hardly necessary to note here that only this second conception is acceptable from the fascist point of view and that only in this way can fascism be anti-bourgeois, while not ceasing to be the irreconcilable enemy of communism and of Marxism – movements that also brandish anti-bourgeois attitudes, but naturally in the first of the two senses hereabove mentioned. Nor is this the place to insist on the polemic which we have already various times brought against certain milieus which, under the brand of being anti-bourgeois, attempt to introduce aberrant, counterfeit and ‘socializing’ interpretations of the Revolution.1

The Bourgeois Surrogates of Aristocracy

We have thus already had occasion to indicate that has no doubt made a false move the moment one takes up the term ‘aristocracy of thought’. The superstitious cult of ‘thought’ is, in reality, one of the traits of bourgeois civilization, which invented this cult and propagated it for obvious polemical reasons. Against the aristocracy of blood and the aristocracy of spirit, and so as to divest these of their authority, bourgeois civilization, consolidated through the advent of the Third Estate, affirmed the right of ‘true’ aristocracy, which was supposedly the aristocracy of ‘thought’. Now, the anti-intellectualism and the virilism, characteristic of new renovating currents and of fascism, suffice bring this bourgeois myth to the bar. What is this ‘aristocracy of thought’? It can be reduced for the most part to the famous ‘intellectuals’, to the creators of philosophical theories, to the poets and the literati, which is to say, to those whom Plato rightly wished to banish from his State – a State which was not in the least, as is vulgarly believed, a utopian model, but which reflected what was traditionally always held to be normal in the affairs of ordinary politics. Now, to perceive the total absurdity and anachronism of this view, it is enough to speak aloud the idea that an elite of ‘intellectuals’ and thinkers should stay in power, though they also might well be, character-wise, cowardly and little more than petit bourgeois.

The ‘aristocracy of thought’ can be reduced for the most part to the famous ‘intellectuals’, whom Plato rightly wished to banish from his State.

As the fumes of the progressivist and scientistic Enlightenment have begun to clear, we cannot conceive of the ‘aristocracy of thought’ even in the terms of scientists, inventors, and technicians. All of these are doubtlessly useful elements for a modern society, and it was an excellent thing to give them the means, with the new corporate order which took the place of the preceding demo-parliamentary order, to act more efficaciously in the compages of the new State. But it is also evident that one cannot recognize even to this ‘aristocracy’ the qualification proper to a ruling class, the creator of a new civilization beyond the bourgeois. It is much more appropriate to Marxism and Bolshevism than to our Revolution to think that an elite of technicians, aiming at resolving purely material, social and economic problems, will conduct a collectivized humanity, over which they exercise control, toward a new Paradise, to such an extent that they can demand any higher recognition.

Having established in these terms the inconsistency of the formula ‘aristocracy of thought’, it remains to us to examine the other idea, which refers to a generically authoritarian and dictatorial notion. Already the fact that there exists such a term as ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ demonstrates the necessity of clarifying the meaning of the terms ‘dictatorship’ and ‘authoritarianism’. It is one of the merits of Pareto2 that he demonstrated the inevitability of the phenomenon of elitism, which is to say of a ruling minority. But with this we are still far from being able to speak correctly of ‘aristocracy’. Has Pareto himself not considered the case in which this elite might be constituted precisely by the bourgeoisie?

But we wish above all to bring something else into relief; namely, the rapport between the aristocracy and the totalitarian-authoritarian idea. If one aims with precision to overcome both the bourgeois and collectivism, one must have very clear ideas regarding the scope, the sense, the limits and the possibilities for development of the totalitarian-authoritarian idea, specifically in relation to the aristocratic idea. To what extent can the totalitarian people-leader formula, which brings liberalism and its irresponsible democratico-bourgeois regime to an end, serve as a valid cornerstone for the new edifice? To what extent can it thoroughly resolve the problem with which we began?

The Double Face of Totalitarianism

Here it is meet that we enter upon what will seem to be delicate ground to those who do not possess adequate principles; we must enter into the field of the relation between the authoritarian idea and absolutism, between the directing unity of an organic State and the tribunal of the people. We have already touched upon this argument in a previous article, where we spoke of the true significance of the actions undertaken by Philip the Fair of France.3

Let us take up the fundamental idea once more by saying that the phenomena of totalitarianism and of statal concentration has various meanings, indeed contrary meanings, according to the type of regime which preceded it.

Let us suppose, as an initial example, the case in which the pre-existing regime in question is that of a well-articulated society, with social strata and even castes which are clear and distinct, not artificially so, but from national vocation – not closed or conflictual, but rather as agents, acting in an orderly concert within a whole hierarchy; let us suppose moreover that the differentiation and the anti-collectivism of this society are also expressed through a certain division of power and of sovereignty, with a certain autonomy of functions and of particular rights, over which the central authority reigns, reinforced rather than diminished in its spiritual sovereignty by this partial decentralization precisely; such a state of affairs can be seen e.g. in the positive aspects of the feudal regime. Now it is evident that if in such a society centralism and totalitarianism were affirmed, these would signify a destruction and a disarticulation, the regression of the organic into the amorphous. To concentrate all powers at the centre in an absolutist fashion is, in such a case, something like to the efforts of a man who wishes to directly refer to his brain every function and activity of the body, and who therefore attains the condition of those inferior organisms who are constituted only by a head and an inarticulate and undifferentiated body.

In the modern state of affairs, the first and most urgent task is that of creating a bulwark, with all available means, so as to neutralize the tendency toward centrifuge through a centripetal political force.

This precisely is the situation in anti-aristocratic and levelling absolutism, which was methodically pursued, under the impetus of a variety of circumstances, by the Kings of France above all, following upon Philip the Fair. And Guénon has rightly observed that it was not an accident that it was precisely first France to undergo the Jacobin revolution, with the advent of the Third Estate. Indeed, those absolutist Kings, enemies of feudal aristocracy, literally dug their own graves. By centralizing, by dissolving and disassembling4 the State, substituting a bureaucratico-statal superstructure for virile and direct forms of authority, of responsibility and of partial personal sovereignty – by doing all of this, the enemies of aristocracy created a void around themselves, because their vain court aristocracy could signify nothing any longer, and the military aristocracy was by then deprived of any direct connection with the country. The differentiated structure which acted as the medium for the nation as mass was destroyed, detached from the sovereign and from his sovereignty. At a blow, the revolution easily abolished that superstructure and put power into the hands of the pure mass. Aristocratic absolutism therefore opens the way to demagoguery and collectivism. Far from having the character of true dominium, it finds its equivalent only in the ancient popular tyrannies and plebeian tribunals, both of which alike are collectivistic forms.

Things stand well otherwise however when the antecedent to the process of authoritarian concentration is not a feudal and organic society, but a ‘modern’ society, which is to say, a society of dissolution. This is the state of affairs in our own society. Liberalism, democracy, egalitarianism, and internationalism had reduced the nation to the condition of mercurial masses who were on the verge of dispersing in every direction, and of sinking down to the point of that total genuflection represented by socialism and by communism. Before such a state of affairs, the first and most urgent task was obviously that of creating a bulwark, a brake, with all available means, so as to neutralize the tendency toward centrifuge through a centripetal political force. And precisely this is the sense and the positive value of the process of fascist totalitarianizing. After having achieved this first task, the next, which immediately presents itself, is to articulate the nation anew, to bring the nation back to itself, to unify it beneath the sign of various myths and symbols and protect it against every disintegrating and dispersive force; this is a matter of shielding it from every form of collectivism and giving life to very clear, hierarchically connected unities, possessing their own persona. Only in this way can it have a structure, an organic reality, capable of persisting in time and armed with its own conservative force – a force that cannot be present in any collective and formless substance, such as is held together only by a given state of mind and by the general structures of the State. Only then will the Revolution truly have generated a new, completely formed being.


1Where the Italian Rivoluzione is obviously meant to refer to the Fascist, and not the French or American, Revolution. When Evola refers to the French Revolution below, he puts it in the lower case. As for his critique of Fascism, it was certainly one of the major themes of his political philosophy, and can be found primarily in A Traditionalist Confronts Fascism, Fascism Viewed from the Right, but also in other books, including his last, Recognitions.

2Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923) was an Italian political scientist and sociologist, but also an engineer. The Pareto Principle, which states that about 80% of the effects for most events come from about 20% of the causes, was his discovery—a most curious principle with a wide variety of applications. Pareto himself noted, for instance, that in Italy about 20% of the population owned about 80% of the land, and that in a garden about 20% of the pea-pods will contain about 80% of the peas. The idea has been put to valid work in economics, management, science, and sports, and it is entertaining, and often fruitful, to try to put it to use in other fields as well. Julius Evola mentions him often in his work, and devotes a laudatory essay to him in Chapter 30 of Recognitions.

3This essay, ‘The Case of Philip the Fair’, has yet to be translated into English. It represents an interesting foray into a bit of history which had re-emerged during the Fascist epoch. Philip the Fair, or Philip IV of France (1268–1314), was considered by some fascists to be a kind of proto-Fascist – idea which Evola strongly critiques in the aforementioned essay.

4Italian: disossando e disarticolando, literally ‘deboning (i.e. extracting all the bones from) and de-articulating (i.e. eliminating all the junctures, pivots, joints etc., as e.g. of a body)’ – a vivid metaphor following from the idea of the ‘organic state’.

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Iranian Hegemony in the Islamic World Tue, 17 Sep 2019 14:04:35 +0000 On September 14, 2019, nineteen targets at the Aramco Abqaiq processing facility and the Khurais oil field were struck from the air with pinpoint accuracy, resulting in the destruction of no less than half of Saudi Arabia’s oil production capability. This represented the loss of 5% of petroleum on the world market. The Houthis of Yemen, who have for years been subjected to a genocidal Saudi Sunni sectarian war against their Shi’ite community, claimed that ten of their drones carried out the attacks. But these proxies of the Islamic Republic of Iran could hardly have had the capability to fly such sophisticated drones so deep into Saudi Arabia, and ten drones cannot hit nineteen separate targets. Further analysis suggested that the targets had all been hit from an angle of approach that pointed toward either Iran or Iraq as the staging ground, and that cruise missiles were used to hit many of the targets. The drones may have been nothing but a ruse. The Houthi claim of responsibility does, however, rule out the possibility that this was some elaborate false flag operation staged by Neo-Cons.

Intelligence analysts initially ventured the possibility that the attacks actually originated in southern Iraq, where, in response to Israeli airstrikes, Hashd-al-Shabih, a Shi’ite militia loyal to Iran recently declared its intention to develop its own airforce. Kuwaitis witnessed unknown aircraft passing through their airspace on the night of the incident, and emanating from the direction of either Iraq or Iran itself. On Monday, September 16, the United States, which maintains a significant presence in Iraq, including radar capabilities, informed the Iraqis that the attacks did not originate on their territory or violate their airspace.

If Iran is indeed responsible for the attacks on Saudi oil production, this would demonstrate an Iranian military competence on par with the most capable armed forces of the world.

In any case, the fact that, several days after the operation, there is still no definitive evidence of the path that the objects took, demonstrates that the objects – whether drones or missiles or both – successfully evaded the radar of Saudi Arabia and possibly other countries as well. The flight path and the point of origin of the attack may be reconstructed by other means at the disposal of US intelligence agencies with classified satellite reconnaissance capabilities. Yet among the tens of billions in military hardware purchased from the United States by Saudi Arabia are state of the art radar installations that cover the Kingdom’s airspace. This means that the operation was so sophisticated that whoever was responsible for it managed to identify all of the holes in Saudi radar coverage and to guide the aircraft and/or missiles through these holes over a distance of hundreds of kilometers before hitting their targets with high precision. If Iran is indeed responsible, this would demonstrate an Iranian military competence on par with the most capable armed forces of the world.

There is one other possibility: Iran has developed stealth aircraft, either manned or unmanned, armed with precision missiles. There have been rumors of unconventional Iranian stealth aircraft for several years now, including speculations that these aircraft were used in the capture of a number of American and Israeli drones, which were landed intact, and reverse engineered. Aside from being one of the top drone designers in the world, Iran is also among a handful of the most advanced nations in the domain of cyber-warfare (of the kind used, on board these unconventional aircraft, to take control of American and Israeli drones).

Regardless of whether Iranians carried out the attack from their own territory, or which of Iran’s Shi’ite proxies were responsible for it, and what Iranian weaponry was used to accomplish it, there can be little doubt that this spectacular strike represents another step toward Iranian hegemony in the Islamic World. Far from preventing Iran’s continued resurgence as a major player on the world stage, the Trump Administration’s idiotic policy of insulting, threatening, and humiliating the Iranian nation has only facilitated this development.

1. The Abject Failure of Trump’s Iran Policy

Donald Trump, who had recognized the significant Saudi role in the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States when he was still running for office, made a trip to Saudi Arabia one of his first priorities as President. There, on 20 May 2017, Trump participated in a Saudi war dance and formed an “anti-terror” alliance with the Saudis against Iran (a country which, unlike Saudi Arabia, has never carried out an act of terrorism on American soil). Shortly after returning from this trip, then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson referred to the Persian Gulf as the “Arabian Gulf.” In his Iran Policy speech of October 13, 2017, President Trump himself used the incorrect term “Arabian Gulf” to brazenly insult Persians when he accused Iran of interfering with maritime traffic in the waters off of its own coastline – at a distance of more than 11,000 kilometers from the shores of America. On March 22, 2018, Trump appointed John Bolton as his National Security Advisor, a man who, for decades, has been a paid lobbyist and propagandist for the MEK, an Islamist-Marxist Iranian terrorist organization that backed Saddam Hussein in his brutal eight-year war against Iran and has a history of murdering Americans.

On May 8, 2018, Trump unilaterally withdrew the United States from the JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal. This was followed by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s announcement of twelve preposterous preconditions for negotiations with Iran that would lead to a new deal. These preconditions included things like Iran’s forfeit of its legitimate international right to Uranium enrichment as well as Iran’s production of ballistic missiles for its national defense. Iran’s rejection of these ridiculously unrealistic demands led, in November of 2018, to the re-imposition of harsh US economic sanctions on Iran, including new sanctions targeting any country that buys Iranian oil. In April of 2019, a six-month waiver that had been given to foreign countries and companies doing business with Iran’s oil sector was terminated and the Trump Administration attempted in earnest to implement a global embargo of Iranian oil. The aim was to put the Iranian economy under such pressure that it would lead to a mass uprising that either brought the Islamic Republic to the negotiating table or ended in a regime change.

Beginning in April, the Trump Administration’s Iran Policy moved from economic warfare to the threat of actual warfare. On April 8, 2019, Mike Pompeo designated the IRGC, Iran’s elite combined military force that is comparable to the US Marine Corps, as a terrorist organization. It was the first time that the United States had designated part of another country’s military as terrorists. This was an extremely threatening move considering the fact that under the 2001 Congressional Authorization of the Use of Military Force in the Global War on Terrorism, Trump would not need to seek approval from the US Congress to go to war against Iran by launching an attack on IRGC “terrorists” inside of Iran. Such an attack almost took place. On May 19, 2019, the President of the United States threatened “the official end of Iran” – not the end of the Islamic Republic, but the destruction of the Iranian nation. This came only days after John Bolton claimed that the United States was preparing to send 120,000 troops and the Abraham Lincoln carrier battle group into the Persian Gulf to confront Iran.

One month later, a US Global Hawk spy drone violated Iranian airspace in the Strait of Hormuz and was shot down by IRGC defensive surface-to-air missile batteries along Iran’s coastline. That night Trump responded by ordering a US airstrike on IRGC targets inside of Iran, an attack that would have begun the worst war that the world has seen since 1945. Just minutes before they would strike their targets, Trump reversed his decision and pulled the planes back. Trump thought that this stunt would bring Iran to the negotiating table, and when he was frustrated in this ambition he posted his most ignorant tweet to date in an attempt to taunt Tehran: “Iranians never won a war, but never lost a negotiation.” In point of fact, Iran has won more than forty major wars in the course of its 3,000 year history – a history which includes the formation of four or five world-class empires, one of these being the largest empire that the world has ever known when estimated in terms of the percentage of Earth’s population that lived as taxpaying Iranian subjects.

Not only did the Trump policy of pressure fail to force Tehran into a renegotiation of the nuclear deal, not only did repeatedly threatening, insulting, and humiliating the rightfully proud Iranian people fail to catalyze protests aimed at regime change, but Iran’s resistance and fortitude in the face of this increased pressure only served to demonstrate the depth and breadth of Iran’s strategic dominance in the heart of the Islamic world. Iran had warned that if it was prevented from selling its oil, then it would have no interest in maintaining the security of oil shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

On May 12, 2019, four oil tankers were damaged near the Fujairah port of the UAE. On June 13, 2019, two oil tankers were attacked in the Gulf of Oman, one Norwegian and the other Japanese – while Shinzo Abe was undertaking the first visit of a Japanese Prime Minister to Iran for decades. It was a special mission to deliver a message from Trump to the Supreme Leader of Iran, to negotiate – or else. Ayatollah Khamenei rejected this ultimatum in the strongest terms imaginable. In response to the British seizure of the Iranian oil tanker “Grace” (subsequently renamed Adriyan Darya) off of Gibraltar on July 4, 2019, in support of the American embargo policy, the Iranian IRGC Navy retaliated against two British tankers in the Persian Gulf on July 19, 2019.

One of these tankers, the Stena Impero, was intercepted, forced to redirect its course, and then boarded by Iranian commandos in direct defiance of a British Royal Navy vessel that ordered the IRGC-armed speed boats intercepting the Stena to stand down. Despite the British Naval vessel’s warnings, the Iranians continued to radio to the Stena tanker: “Alter your course immediately… If you obey, you will be safe. If you obey, you will be safe.” The Iranian commandos, who rappelled from a helicopter onto the deck, took control of the British tanker and sailed the Stena into an Iranian port on the Strait of Hormuz – or the Strait of Ahura Mazda (Middle Persian Ohrmazd or Hormuz).

The will to ensure that the Persian Gulf does not become “Arabian” is based on more than just patriotic sentimentality, let alone nationalistic chauvinism.

Within two months of this incident, Donald Trump fired John Bolton as his National Security Advisor and reiterated that he is “not looking for regime change” and that Iran “has a chance to be a great country even with the same leadership.” At the time of writing, Trump is considering extending a $15 billion credit line to Iran on the hope that Iranian President Rouhani might meet with him at the UN later this month. Meanwhile, the petroleum processing plants and oil fields of Saudi Arabia burn. Trump has also stated that he is in no rush to launch a retaliatory strike against Iran.

2. Contenders for “Core State” of the Islamic World

The will to ensure that the Persian Gulf does not become “Arabian” is based on more than just patriotic sentimentality, let alone nationalistic chauvinism. Iran is certainly a civilization among only a handful of other living civilizations on Earth, rather than a lone state with its own isolated culture, like Japan, but Iran is even more than that. As we enter the era of the clash of civilizations, Iran’s historic role as the crossroads of all of the other major civilizations cannot be overstated.

In this context it must be recognized that Iran is not just another civilization, on par with the West, India, or China. In the event that it is allowed to return to its own heritage and reclaim its proper destiny, Iran could be the cosmopolitan nexus for a dialogue of civilizations with a view to their eventual convergence in the most constructive way imaginable. The first step toward that, must however, be the transformation of the core of the current sphere of so-called “Islamic Civilization” back into an Iranian civilizational sphere. This demands that Iran become what Samuel Huntington would call the “core state” of Islamic Civilization.

Iran has seven potential rivals for the status of Islamic civilizational core state, namely: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Most of these countries are utterly incapable of leading the Islamic world, and the few that are capable of doing so would never be able to make the case that they can transform so-called “Islamic Civilization” into something that would at least be benign, if not beneficent, when considered in terms of its implications for the human community at large and in view of the demographic dominance of Muslims on Earth by the mid to late twenty-first century. Let us briefly take a look at each of these potential rivals to Iran.

Saudi Arabia is the nation within the borders of which Mecca and Medina, the two holiest cities in Islam, are located. It is the territory of both Muhammad’s own prophetic mission and the administrative capital of the Rashidun Caliphate, the first Caliphate in the history of Islam. In a world still largely dependent on oil for energy and transportation, Saudi Arabia was – until the Iranian proxy attack of September 14 – the Earth’s leading oil producing nation. On that basis alone, it became one of the wealthiest nations on Earth. This key energy production role in the global economy garnered Saudi Arabia a diplomatic and military ally in the United States of America. But it has just become clear how vulnerable Saudi Arabia’s petroleum industry is – even in the face of Iran’s proxies, let alone the damage it would suffer if attacked by Iran directly.

These are, moreover, the only factors in favor of Saudi Arabia assuming the role of Islamic civilizational core state. In light of the competition, they are far from sufficient. Although Islam as a religion appears to have originated in the Arabian peninsula, none of the great civilizational achievements commonly attributed to Islam took place there. Arabia, Saudi or otherwise, is culturally barren and backwards. The Saudis have the most barbaric and inhumane socio-political system of any major player on the world stage. This ought not to be surprising, since the Hejaz is a desert wasteland populated by camel herders. The country has no indigenous agricultural capacity and has never had any significant industrial capability. The Saudi “nation” is a totally artificial construction dating back to 1932. Prior to that, despite the status of Mecca and Medina, the uninhabitable peninsula was peripheral to the Islamic world for most of history. Saudi Arabia’s entire mirage of wealth, and the purchased paper tiger of its military might, rests on a non-renewable energy resource discovered by Western colonialists in the twentieth century – a resource that will run dry within the next twenty years.

After the fall of the Arabian peninsula-based Rashidun Caliphate, the administrative capital of the Islamic world moved to Baghdad under both the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs. The nation-state of Iraq was formed in the same year as Saudi Arabia, namely 1932. Historically, both the names “Baghdad” and “Iraq” refer to parts of Iran. Bogh-Dâd means either “given by God” or “God’s Justice” in the Middle Persian language of the Parthian period, when the city was founded in what was then Western Iran. The term Erâq is a geographical designator for the mountainous region of southwestern Iran, with the part that remains in Iran today being referred to as Erâqé Ajami or “Aryan Iraq.”

From October 29, 539 BC, when Cyrus the Great marched into Babylon until the Arab-Muslim conquest of the Sassanid state in 651 AD, Iraq was the administrative capital of Iran through three successive Iranian empires, that of the Achaemenids, the Parthians, and the Sassanians. By about 900 AD, semi-autonomous Persian fiefdoms in northern Iran had essentially reduced the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad into their own cat’s paw. Even once the Seljuq Turks took over in the middle of the eleventh century, the administrative elite of the Caliphate remained Persian. Iraq then changed hands between the Ottoman Caliphate and Iran for a period of several hundred years under the Safavid and Afsharid dynasties. It is not until around the year 1800, relatively recently in the scope of Iran’s history, that most of Iraq, including Baghdad, was lost – first to the Turks and then to Western colonialists aligned with the country’s Arab majority. Even still, the Arabs of Iraq remained largely Shi’ite and thereby under the religious influence of Iran. Meanwhile, the Kurds in northern Iraq, while Sunni, are ethnically Iranian and speak an Iranian language.

All of this is to say that, in civilizational terms, Iraq is essentially an integral part of Iran and has been so for about twenty-five centuries. The one brief epoch of radically anti-Iranian politics in Iraq, the period of Saddam Hussein, is when Iraq came closest to assuming leadership of the Islamic world at large. Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in 1990–1991, a few years after the failure of his eight-year long campaign to seize Iran’s oil-rich Khuzestan province, was fated to be nothing more than a passing gleam. As an avowed secular Arab nationalist, Saddam would never have fooled anyone into believing that he had the legitimacy to hold Mecca and Medina and to speak as the vice-regent of Allah on Earth.

Ironically, it was only after the total destruction of Saddam’s Arab nationalist regime in the 2003 American invasion of Iraq that the country became the base of operations for a ragtag group of partisans and mercenaries who claimed to constitute a new Sunni Caliphate, with a caliph named “Baghdadi.” The actual government in Baghdad had become little more than a Shi’ite client state of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Meanwhile, the ethnically Iranian Kurds in the north began their march toward secession from an “Iraq” that had clearly become a failed state because nothing coherent or cohesive ever really held it together after it was severed from the Persian and Ottoman Empires. With the recent defeat of Islamic State forces within Iraq, albeit after the destruction of irreplaceable cultural treasures by those barbarians, it is clear that the reemergence of Iraq as a core state of Islamic Civilization is totally out of the question. Not now. Not ever. Iraq will continue to be dominated by either Iran or Turkey.

As much as Recep Tayyip Erdogan would like to be looked back on as the founder of a New Ottoman Caliphate, Turkey’s prospects for leading the Islamic world at large are rather grim. In a scenario where Iran were to lose what is left of Azerbaijan within its own borders, and a greater Republic of Azerbaijan connects Turkey to the Caspian Sea and across to the Turkic lands of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, a Pan-Turkic federation of some kind is conceivable. This is, not incidentally, all the more reason for Iranians to insist on holding Tabriz and Ardebil, potentially even recapturing Baku, by any and all means necessary – including the reaffirmation of Shi’ite discourse.

However, these Turkic territories are peripheral to the Islamic world. The language barrier between Turks and Arabs, and the significant differences between their cultures, poses a nearly insurmountable barrier to any reassertion of Turkish control over Arabia. First of all, to do so, Sunni Turkey would have to pass through the most solidly Shi’ite among the Arab lands, namely Iraq and Syria, not to mention through the rest of Kurdistan – one third of which is already inside of Turkey’s borders. These are all lands within the Iranian civilizational sphere – Iraq and Syria on account of Shi’ism and Kurdistan on account of its Iranian ethno-linguistic identity. Moreover, in a rivalry with Iran, both the Kurds and a sizeable Shi’ite minority in Eastern Anatolia could be mobilized against the government of Turkey. By contrast, the capacity of a Neo-Ottoman Turkey to mobilize self-identifying “Turks” in Iranian Azerbaijan against the government of Iran would be limited by the hardline Sunni stance of this Neo-Ottoman Calipahte as compared to the Shi’ite identity of the Azeris in Iran.

In short, Turkey is locked in. There is certainly no question of a Westward expansion of a Neo-Ottoman Caliphate. The countries of Eastern Europe, who have the bitterest memories of Ottoman rape and pillage have been the first to reject European Union migration policies and erect a cultural barrier against the Islamization of Europe. The massive number of Turks in Germany poses a serious national security threat to that country, but they are separated from Turkey by this anti-Islamic firewall in the Visegrád region. The most likely outcome is that the continued degradation of German culture at their hands will eventually lead to their mass expulsion or internment by ethnic Germans. If anything the Turkish threat to Eastern and Central Europe should be reason for the Visegrád Group, and ultimately Germany as well, to support Shi’ite Iran as a strong Eastern ally against Turks with an ambition of reestablishing a Sunni Ottoman Caliphate. Such an alliance existed between Safavid Iran and some European powers at war with the Ottoman Empire, and it would make a great deal of sense for this paradigm to be revived.

Pakistan was never the seat of the Caliphate. In fact, Pakistan was not even a nation until its secession from India in 1947. The discourse surrounding and justifying that secession was, however, an explicitly Islamist discourse and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was consciously conceived of as a bastion for all of the Muslims of the world. Practically speaking, this served no real purpose other than to reinforce the artificiality and rootlessness of the so-called Pakistani “nation.” At no point have Arabs, Turks, and others in the Islamic world ever come to consider Pakistan an exemplary Islamic State, let alone a country that would lead the Islamic world in a way comparable to America’s leadership of the Western world. This, despite the fact that Pakistan is (as of the time of writing) the only Muslim country to have developed nuclear weapons, and there appears to be a tacit agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, who largely financed the Pakistani nuclear program, to provide the latter with these weapons in the event of a threat to Mecca and Medina. Even still, this Pakistan-Saudi Axis has never been tested by war, and if the war should prove to be one between Iran and Saudi Arabia, it is doubtful that Pakistan would risk war with Iran by coming to the aid of the Saudis.

Pakistanis are well aware of the fact that the closest thing that Pakistan has to a cultural heritage is the legacy of the Mughal Empire, which was a Persianate culture through and through. Pakistan is nothing other than Persianate India. The denial of this heritage, and the idiotic adoption of Urdu as a national language in an area where Persian had been dominant for hundreds of years until British colonization, has led to cultural rootlessness and the rise of Sunni fundamentalist ideology. The potential for a Taliban-style Islamist seizure of power in at least some parts of Pakistan cannot be dismissed, but given the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, this would pose such a grave threat both to India and to Western powers allied with India, including Israel, that such an Islamist toppling of Pakistan’s central government and seizure of power even in a single province would mean a massive military intervention with only one final outcome: reintegration of a devastated Pakistan into India. Such a forcible reversal of the partition would probably result in a religious clash between Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs on a genocidal scale and cripple the capacity of Pakistanis – or, in that event, North Indian Muslims – to lead the Islamic world. They will be busy enough defending themselves from Hindus and Sikhs within the borders of a re-unified India.

Advocates of an Iranian Renaissance need to understand that an attempt to lobotomize Iran through a forced return to Zoroastrianism would sever Iran’s connection to the other countries in its civilizational sphere.

The neighboring Southeast Asian nations of Malaysia and Indonesia are so peripheral to the Islamic world that the potential for either of them to lead the Arab or Turkic peoples in the formation of a new Caliphate is, from a geographical and historical perspective, utterly preposterous. They merit mention only because the former is among the wealthiest nations in the Islamic world and the latter is among the most populous. Both countries have even been home to some of the most zealous support for Al-Qaeda, particularly, Malaysia, where Osama bin Laden is seen as a hero by many devout Sunnis. In short, Malay financial power and Indonesian military force could play a significant role in an intercontinental Sunni Caliphate in the event that one were to be successfully established in some other, more central part of the Islamic world. Another reason why both Western powers and the Chinese ought to back an Iranian Shi’ite dominance of the Islamic world is that under such a scenario, Sunni Malaysia and Indonesia would become so peripheral and irrelevant to the core of the Islamic world, as they were during the period of the classic Caliphates, that the archipelago would be left for China to dominate. This region is home to the second largest community of oversees Chinese in the world. While the West is rightly weary of the rise of China, it remains the case that Chinese dominance of the Malay archipelago is preferable to its becoming a bastion of Islamists.

3. Sunni Caliphate or Shi’ite Imamate

Of all of the countries that could potentially rival Iran for leadership of the Islamic world, Egypt is actually the most viable contender. Iran and Egypt were closely connected during the one period when Egypt was the seat of the Caliphate, namely the Fatamid period, which is the only time that Shi’ites dominated the entire Islamic world. It is the Ismaili Fatamids of Egypt who finally stopped the Westward advance of the Mongols. Egypt has, of course, since become solidly Sunni. Like Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and unlike the remaining countries that we are about to address, its language is the Arabic language that is authoritative for Islamic theology and the language of the majority of Muslims in the historical core of the Islamic world. In fact, it is the Arabic of Cairo that has become standard for the entire Islamic world in modern times – not the Arabic spoken in the Arabian peninsula itself. Al-Azhar in Cairo remains the world’s leading Muslim theological academy.

Said Qotb’s ideology of Al-Qaeda and the organizational infrastructure of the Muslim Brotherhood took shape in the shadows of this conservative Sunni school of thought. In a scenario where the Al-Saud regime in Arabia meets its demise, whether through internal upheaval or war with Iran (or both), there is a potential for Egypt to reemerge as the core of a Sunni Arab-Muslim Caliphate that extends from Morocco to Oman and as far south as Sudan. Such a situation ought not to be conceived of in terms of the projection of conventional Egyptian military force, nor does it require Egypt to emerge as a major industrial power. Rather, the Cairo-based Caliphate scenario is one that has, as its precondition, the collapse of the Egyptian national state and the surrender of its secularist military to an Islamist movement that is radically transnational – or, at the very least, Pan-Arab in its ideological orientation.

This is exactly the kind of threat that ought to convince major world powers to at least tolerate, if not encourage, an Iranian dominance of the Islamic world. First of all, such a Caliphate would be taking shape on the doorstep of the State of Israel and it is abundantly clear that its cohesion, even at any early stage, would have to involve the annihilation of Israel. Cooperation with Israel has been forced upon the succession of undemocratic but relatively secular Egyptian administrations since the 1970s precisely because this has been felt as such a serious long-term strategic threat. It is actually the main reason why, with the brief anomaly of Barack Obama’s misadventure in Cairo, Western powers have not been keen on supporting democratization in Egypt. The brief Obama Administration experiment of supporting the Arab Spring, including in Egypt, yielded a democratic but fundamentalist Islamic regime led by the Muslim Brotherhood. Had it not been for General Al-Sisi’s Western-backed coup d’état, this democratic election would have put Cairo on track to becoming the epicenter of a new Caliphate.

If Iran is to play a significant role in determining how the basic existential conditions of human life can be secured in the face of a potential technological singularity, then Iran must reemerge as a world power within the next twenty years.

One catastrophic danger that immediately became apparent during the crisis of the brief Muslim Brotherhood rule in Egypt was a Sunni fundamentalist threat to ancient Egyptian monuments and artifacts. The situation became so dire that, at one point, prime time Egyptian national television was hosting Mufti guests promising to blow up the Giza Pyramids. It became easy to imagine that one fine morning we would all wake up to scenes of the Great Sphinx having been decapitated with dynamite by the cover of night. It is true that in the early days of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, there were a few zealots within the rising regime who had similar ideas with regard to Persepolis or the tombs of the Achaemenid emperors. However, the traditional stance of Shi’ism prevailed and, as was the case in the Safavid period, let alone with the ultra-Persian Ismaili Shi’ites in the medieval period, the Pre-Islamic heritage of Iran was appropriated by the Shi’ite clergy to bolster their Imamate in a way comparable to the Roman-ness of the Catholic Church.

Oftentimes one’s enemies have a clearer perception of oneself. So we ought to take very seriously the claims of surrounding Sunni Arab countries that contemporary expansionist Shi’ite militancy is actually a reassertion of Persian Imperialism (including in Turkic, but Shi’ite Azerbaijan). Unlike Iran, Egypt has no organic continuity with its ancient cultural heritage. There have been too many disruptions and changes of language in the country, from the ancient Persians, to the classical Greeks, and the Romans, all before the Arab-Muslim conquest, to the Ottoman Turks later in the Islamic period. The native Egyptian language and culture did not even survive into the pagan Roman epoch, let alone into Islamic times. The contemporary nation of Egypt is an artificial British colonial construction from out of the ruins of the Ottoman Caliphate. It is so uprooted that Taliban-style destruction of ancient Egyptian cultural treasures is conceivable.

4. Synthesizing Pan-Shi’ism with Pan-Iranism

In the battle for hearts and minds, worldwide, an Iranian Shi’ite Imamate will trump an Egyptian Sunni Caliphate any day. Even Israel would align with a militantly Shi’ite Iran if it were to be presented with such a binary. Furthermore, if a Sunni Cairo-based Caliphate were to endorse or even condone vandalism committed against archeological sites, or destroy the extensive tourism industry of Egypt, it is likely that a significant enough segment of secularists in the country would align with Western powers to re-impose some type of colonial rule over Egypt – in whatever masked form that would need to take for the sake of salvaging an archeological heritage that belongs to all mankind. This could happen in the context of a broader NATO or European intervention on the North African side of the Mediterranean. Israel could, under these conditions, recapture the Sinai peninsula.

All of that would be completely compatible with Iranian dominance further to the East – especially in Shi’ite parts of Syria, Iraq, the Kurdish territories, Azerbaijan, Shi’ite parts of the Persian Gulf, southwestern Yemen, and the Shi’ite and Tajik parts of Central Asia – especially Herat, Kabul, Badakhshan, Dushanbe, Samarkand, and Bukhara. Such a geopolitical strategy requires a fusion of the Shi’ite Muslim and Pan-Iranist discourses. The Pan-Iranist discourse would be more significant in Sunni parts of Iranian Civilization, such as Kurdistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and relevant parts of Uzbekistan.

In other words, a Renaissance of Iran’s leadership of the Islamic world ought not to be considered solely in terms of a Shi’ite victory in a sectarian war with Sunnis. Continued Iranian dominance across all Shi’ite Muslim territories is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the renaissance of Iran as a civilization, one that is at least geopolitically on par with China in the rivalry to define the World Order of the twenty-first century. This return to superpower status also requires Iran reaching into Sunni parts of its civilizational sphere on the basis of a renaissance of the Iranian heritage.

Advocates of an Iranian Renaissance need to understand that an attempt to lobotomize Iran through a forced return to Zoroastrianism (as if it ever exclusively defined even the Pre-Islamic heritage of Iran) would sever Iran’s connection to the other countries in its civilizational sphere. Overthrowing the Islamic Republic would result in the shattering of the nation’s industrial infrastructure and economic system, the dissolution of its current military force, and possibly even violent attempts at secession on the part of ethnic minorities. This would definitively derail Iran from its track to becoming the core state of what is currently understood to be “Islamic Civilization” and what, over time, can be transformed back into Iranian Civilization. It would, in Alexander Dugin’s terms, ensure that Iran never becomes a pole in a multipolar world order. I say never because we do not have an infinite time frame wherein Iran’s reemergence as a world power, or even a superpower, can take place.

As I argued in World State of Emergency (Arktos 2017), convergent advancements in technology will face the human species as a whole with an apocalyptic singularity within the next thirty years. If Iran is to play a significant role in determining how these technologies are regulated and how the basic existential conditions of human life can be secured in the face of this potential singularity, and with a view to Iranian values, then Iran must reemerge as a world power within the next twenty years. The only way for that to happen is through a transformation of the current regime, not a chaotic regime change. The only concrete path to such global influence at the moment of what will be the greatest crisis ever faced by humanity, is for Iran to continue to consolidate control over the Middle East and Central Asia as the hegemon of the Islamic World.

The Iranian economist and political scientist, Dr. Hooshang Amirahmadi has characterized the Islamic Republic of Iran as having passed through several phases in its respective emphasis on Islamic versus Iranian identity. Initially, the regime began with an Islam–Islam ideology in 1980s, then shifted to an Islam–Iran position in the late 1990s into the early 2000s. Now as the discourse of many Iranian politicians across the country’s political spectrum, from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Javid Zarif, tends to emphasize a pride in the Iranian heritage and a defense of Iran’s national interest over Islamist rhetoric, the country is passing into an Iran-Islam phase. The point of culmination for this socio-political trajectory is an Iran-Iran phase that will also represent the full-blown realization of an Iranian Renaissance. Iranian society should pass into that phase in an organic fashion, after Iran has established its civilizational hegemony over the heart of the Islamic world – including control of the oil fields on the southern coast of the Persian Gulf and administration of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. What a better world we would be living in if the Grand Mosque at Mecca were broadcasting the poetry of Rumi and Hafez to all Muslims, rather than spewing Wahabi and Salafist ideology.

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Confessions Before Our Old God Fri, 13 Sep 2019 12:35:47 +0000 It might seem quite ridiculous and insolent that I, a trifling artist and child of our postmodern age, should write of such noble and sublime things as gods and faith. That I should judge the faiths which our ancestors once held, when I, and all of us today, stand so far below the heights of their bright spirit and passionate sacrifices.

Yet this is exactly what I must do, precisely because I am a child of our postmodern age. For while these men forever shine with the undying light of Eternity, the ages from which they ascended are gone, and time has forever severed us from the world of Tradition wherein they acted. We are alone, we postmodern children, and Fate has forced us to find a new path to the heights of our ancestors, as all bridges behind us have been swallowed by the dark currents of modernity.

Thus by speaking against the faith of our ancestors, I am not aiming to defile them – how could any mud even be thrown to reach the heights of their heavenly peaks? – but rather to find a path which we can walk, and through which we can honour their deeds by deeds of our own.

So it is not from out of any imagined greatness of my own that I write this confession, but rather it is from my incompleteness as a child of this age. And in this writing, I shall not do as I have previously done and write hidden behind the words of men greater than me, distorting what they have said to fit what I myself feel within our Age. Rather I will plunge into my own heart, and unearth the currents that have flown hidden, undeveloped or denied in my previous writing – thus both destroying and completing what I have written before.

The greatest and most important movement in my writing has been the movement towards Christ – the realization of his greatness, in spite of the Nietzschean and Pagan outlook on life which I previously had. Yet when this movement and image was completed, and I returned to the Bible and the actual words of Christ, I could not recognize what I had painted before me. There was someone else on my canvas, someone I had mistaken for Christ, and whom I had forced into the ill-fitting robes of the noble Nazarene.

We must wholly and bravely believe in a coming Ragnarök – in a destruction of everything old which return our realms to their true Origin and Tradition.

Then who was it that I had painted? Is he a God of the future which is to come? Certainly not, for I am no priest, and much less a prophet. I could never achieve the clear vision and exalted sublimity needed to discern the coming of a new God. I am not nearly delusional enough to see in this mere painter a new John who would baptize our people, with the promise of a Messiah and God which we have not known or seen before.

As an artist, I am just a starved and miserable dog, trapped and confined within the strangling vines and dark foliage of our Age. I can do nothing but chase blindly after fleeting images, trying to clench my fangs around the ghostly prey of a Life which has been taken from me. It is an existence among rustling leaves and wailing winds, among rotten trunks far away from the golden steppes of holy priests and warriors. So what is it that I have caught between my fangs?

It can be nothing more than a piece of a long-forgotten past. A blue inch of some old cloak, embroidered with thin golden threads from a Golden Age. A bundle of strands, which once had flowed like an eternal spring from the shoulders of a Father and Lord, but which now have been torn apart by the currents of Time.

By mere luck, my blind hunt had placed upon my swollen tongue the taste of a lost age. And the small golden spark still residing in this cloth spread like flaming gasoline through my meagre body, burning with the stinging, metallic scent of a titanic sword, which had come at the end of Ages to vanquish whatever has become weak and broken. To prepare the soil of our realms for something both new and ancient, by burning everything old into fertilizing ashes.

But who was He I had but glimpsed? It could not be our pagan gods – it could not be that old and ghostly Odin of the fairy-world, who depended on the golden apples of a woman for life, who depended on sons to fight his battles, who depended on a well for knowledge, and who depended on a successor to take his place the day he died. Yes, in the great mishmash of animistic nature worship and all-too-human gods that is Paganism, I could not recognize the unmoved blue of the Sky and flaming gold of the Sun which I had caught in my mouth.

Thus it was only to Christ I could turn. For Christ told of a one and only God, an absolute and self-sufficient perfection, who yet had chosen to create this world – who yet had chosen, through his unfathomable love, to tread upon it with bleeding feet and a noble crown of thorns and suffering. In this absurd and beautiful image, I could recognize both the cold, still blue of the sky, and the scorching flames of loving gold. And I could not think of any greater image known to us – yet I never set foot in a church.

I talked of the reasons why Christianity was a dead Tradition. I said that it had broken its initiation to the original greatness of Christ, or lost its power over our peoples. But no Christian would believe that Christ is not always present, no matter the depths into which his church falls, to welcome those who seek him. And no Christian would express doubt in the victory of his own church – in the victory of Christ’s own body – and instead choose to merely observe the struggle of the church from outside.

I talked of creating new forms which could manifest the Father in tomorrow, but for a Christian, there can be no new forms. Christ is already the complete and definite, and there can only be deviations from him. And who could ever create anything which could reach the heights of God himself? Who could ever repeat the sacrifice of God made Man? The mere thought of such ‘new forms’ must make a man cringe with shame.

So I had to realize, either that I was the worst and most cowardly Christian to ever walk the earth, or that I simply did not believe in Christ – that I made my reservations not because I feared to struggle for him against modernity, but because of a repressed knowledge that I did not see him as my Lord at all.

It was not Christ that I had painted, but neither was it Thor – rather it was a spark of that original Fire and Father, of which Thor was but a faint glow.

And I know that I do not fear modernity; that I do not fear the wrath of our despicable enemies or the lies of the filthy polluters – hence it must have been someone other than Christ that I had seen. Someone whom I, in my own ignorance, had fused together with the image of Christ, to the disgrace of them both, and myself.

At the height of my veneration of Christ, I tried to paint him on the cross. But I could not bear myself to paint the noble Nazarene. I could not align with the Christian faith and its spirit the image I felt the need to create – I could only paint Christ through the appearance of a dying Thor, who had both slayed the World-Serpent and sacrificed himself for the world below.

But how could that be, when both my reason and heart know Thor to be such an incomplete idol amongst a pantheon of idols? There must have been something else hidden within Thor, which aligned itself with the forgotten God whose torn cloak I had found a piece of, and the embroideries I wanted to reflect. Something which was not Pagan, but rather the source from which Paganism had fallen, a source which far outshines that of Christianity.

It was not Christ that I had painted, but neither was it Thor – rather it was a spark of that original Fire and Father, of which Thor was but a faint glow. But still, it was of this fire that Thor glowed faintly, and as such, there was still something in him which could make the unintelligible embroideries dance with the sense of a clear vision. Even if it was just with a mere fraction of the Light they once reflected, they still shone.

But it was absolutely not a Pagan painting – no, not at all. For I could as little bear myself to paint this image in the standard bright red and heavy, earthly colours that permeates the Pagan depictions of Thor, as I could to paint it in the lamb-white colours of Christianity.

The final colours came to me in a summer night, in these Northern twilights which never really turn into darkness, but rather linger upon the edge of life and death. I lay among blue bedclothes, which in the solemn light glowed mildly in the same cold and still colours as the sky outside of my window. And I saw upon this blue the skin of my own thigh, in its rosy white, which behind fabrics had been spared the scorching light of a summer sun.

I could see Life tense through the fibre of my muscles, as I flexed my flesh upon the sky-like bed, and I could feel the rising course of an ancient blood, which wished to flow as much in the body I had inherited, as among the rosy clouds which glistered through the glass panes.

And when my eyes moved inwards, to the fatter and softer insides of my thighs, I could almost feel the dark dagger of Fate itself, aimed at the vulnerable veins throbbing beneath an all-too thin skin. And at the infinitely small point where this sharp blade touched my living flesh – luring almost unnoticeable, waiting for a moment to plunge into my body – I could feel the unity of Life and Death. I could see it, in the struggling flow of the blood, and its final, grand gushing through the wounds of Fate.

I saw the colours of the Father, whose love and sacrifice I wanted to paint – the cold blue of the sky, the rosy white of twilight clouds, and a gushing sun of Blood. I saw his Hyperborean spirit and blood, and his choice to flow and pour through a people of war-torn, Northern steppes. And it was this sensation of violent Life lived through Death, of spirit flowing through gushing blood and flowering in total destruction, that I could not find in that heavenly afterlife of the Christian.

Christ was necessary for me, and for Europe as a whole, as a denier and vanquisher of that broken and fallen mess we know as Paganism. But I will say that Christ is not the God whose memory is flowing through our blood.

For the Christian may speak of being a part of Christ’s body – but this is not a body which tears itself apart for the spiritual fulfillment of struggling blood, but a vessel whose ultimate goal is to dissolve and leave this world behind, carrying with it the Christian. And the Christian may speak of already having faced Death and Life together with Christ, through the rebirth of baptism – but this is a Death for Life, rather than that Hyperborean Life which lives through Death and War.

Christianity is like the Gothic cathedral, with its vertical lines converging in slender towers, almost floating above the earth. It is a solely upwards-striving architecture of elegant beauty, escaping the filth and sin of the horizontal world below. But it is only the Ancient temple that can truly resonate with Hyperborean blood. For in that temple weight and power is the main principle, expressed in the strong and vertical pillars of spirit which carry the pain of a large, horizontal slab upon their shoulders, unto eternity. Yes, where the Gothic spire escapes the world, the Ancient temple stands up to elevate the world – to lift the horizontal slab of marble that was once hidden in the earth, so that it can shine with the purest white, as a part of the sky itself.

Yet when I woke the next morning to paint in the colours I had seen, cowardly reason had again taken place. And only knowing of the Pagan gods and Christ, it had to tell me that it was Christ I painted, bleeding among the scales of the World-Serpent.

But now I’ve realized who I actually wanted to paint – the one and only Sky Father, who is at the origin and centre of Aryan Tradition.

I will never take back anything I have said of Christ’s greatness and beauty, nor will I deny that our ancestors saw some great Truth in Christ, and lived glorious lives in his image. Neither would I ever attempt to ridicule those of my friends who wholeheartedly seek for Christ, and want to live by his light – for they will probably live far more noble and fulfilled lives than I, a dog-like artist, can ever hope for.

Christ was necessary for me, and for Europe as a whole, as a denier and vanquisher of that broken and fallen mess we know as Paganism. But I will say that Christ is not the God whose memory is flowing through our blood, and that I wish, despite the high deeds of Christianity, that Christianity has had its run, and is facing the end of its cycle. This so that our true, original Father can return – he who as of now remains hidden, far beyond the fog of Paganism.

Yes, Paganism is a damp and dead fog obscuring our original peaks, and it is far worse to be a Pagan today than a Christian. I, who dream of the infinite reaches from which Paganism fell, can harbor nothing but disdain for those who worship dead remains of false gods, mixed with the stinking soil of animistic ghosts.

The Pagan gods can be seen as nothing more than distortions and degenerations, only having their value in the fact that they clung to some small spark of the original Sky Father and his eternal Flame. To then cling to the ashes of these clingers can be seen as nothing more than spiritual weakness and idolatry – instead we must kill within us all old Pagan gods, kings and priests, in order to unearth the original Fire with which they once burned, but which they themselves never were.

But how are we to reach this original Father and Fire? Any reconstruction or backward gazing is of course completely impossible – for the original Father of the Aryan Tradition is completely hidden by the past, and even if we knew him, we could not summon him by only sewing back together the tattered remains of his garments.

Instead we must look forwards. But who among us could ever dream of reaching the skies all by himself, to show the Father’s will to us? It is simply unimaginable, and to say otherwise is to forever hide the true Father behind a false and idolatrous faith in our own insignificant power as men.

He is far too high for anyone of the flesh to reach, and this is our great despair. Yet this despair is also our greatest hope, for it means that neither our ancestors, the first Aryans of flesh and blood, could reach the Father on their own, but rather that he must have shown himself to them. Any true knowledge of the Sky Father demands that he treads down, in some way or another, and if he has tread down once, he can do it again, igniting yet another turn of our cycle.

We must not look back to the last and lowest remnants of the previous Hyperborean Tradition – that is, not look back to the mishmash which we know as Paganism. Rather, we must wholly and bravely believe in a coming Ragnarök – in a destruction of everything old which return our realms to their true Origin and Tradition. We must believe as our ancestors did, that the height and beginning of a Cycle paradoxically lies hidden beneath its bottom and end.

We must believe that He will show himself again, through the end of our current civilization and that coming war, which hangs so ominously and inevitable, like a dark blade, above the head of Europa. Believe that He will lay waste to everything which we sad descendants of old Heroes know, yet at the same time bring back everything we’ve forgotten, thus rekindling the European sun.

But unlike the Pagan, we will not hope for a successor of Odin at the end of Ragnarök and the dawn of Tomorrow – rather we will wish for the original Sky Father himself, Him for whom Odin was but a faint retainer.

Thus I am not a Pagan; rather, I have faith in Him who is the source from which Paganism fell. Furthermore, I have complete faith in his Return. But because of that, I am at the same time of a Paganism far greater than that which any actual Pagan knows and professes.

So what am I to do with this faith? As I’ve said, I’m just a man of our age, and I can have no pretensions or delusions of being able to reach the Sky Father anew. And I’ll never take on the role of a charlatan or false prophet, misleading my brethren with empty words – for no words or thought of man can ever show Him to us again. Instead I’ll only live as what I am – a dog-like artist – and I’ll never again pretend that my art is anything more than the craft of such a dog. And I’ll only live as who I am – a man of my people – and carry out such duties as Fate will put upon my shoulders.

Not because any of these things in itself will lead to the return of the Sky Father, but because this is the only way in which I can express my Faith in Him and His Return. The only thing I can do is to face the great and dark struggle that is to come, now at the end of our old Age. I can only throw myself towards the godless and howling Fimbulwinter – but I will do so with the burning Faith that He is at the other side.

And if I amount to nothing more than a dog’s death, if I am never to see our true Father in my lifetime, but only am to disappear in the darkness before the break of dawn – then what of that? A dog lives a dog’s life, and dies a dog’s death – and there’s nothing more to it.

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