EU Election Analysis: Rightward Shift without Real Change

European elections: What conclusions should be drawn for political work?

The establishment is howling about a shift to the right in the European elections. However, is such an observation true? Does that, in fact, hint at a political change of course towards the direction of national self-determination, value-conservative societal manifestation and remigration policy? Indeed, the European election did bring about certain changes, but before jumping to conclusions that could easily lead us astray, it is advisable to take a closer look or a look ‘behind the scenes’ to realise that no change of any relevance is to be expected in Brussels and Strasbourg.

First of all, even after this election, the legislative initiative still lies with the EU Commission and NOT (!) with the European Parliament. The latter has only a right of initiative in the legislative area to request the EU Commission to submit a proposal. Given such circumstances, two things should be understood clearly: firstly, that a withdrawal from that sovereignty-depriving Union would be an act of self-respect and common sense, and secondly, that this ‘operation-castrated’ parliament should be used primarily as an agitation platform for opposition politics to bring about or accelerate tipping points regarding the public political sentiment. However, the results for genuinely ethno-nationalist formations of paradigmatically different ideas, such as DIE HEIMAT (formerly known as NPD) in Germany, were unfortunately extremely sobering, which is why there is a lack of competitive pressure for civic-right parties, such as the AfD, to strive for the oppositional optimum to represent what is worth being called an ‘alternative’. That is clearly demonstrated by how the AfD treated their own leading candidates, more or less at the behest of the establishment, followed by the pitiful behaviour of Le Pen’s Rassemblement National.

Hardly Even Blockade Power

Apart from up to 100 non-attached — and de facto ineffective — parliamentarians from fragmented small parties, who, moreover, cannot necessarily be said to have any reform impetus at all, the Identity and Democracy Group (ID) is expected to have 58 members and the Group of European Conservatives and Reformers (ECR) will probably have 73 members — the rest of the 720 MEPs are more or less mainstream. The 131 members of the ID and ECR, who are by no means ideologically united, will probably not even be able to block projects in most cases, as the established party caste agrees — apart from nuances — on the principal trajectory of the mostly disastrous decisions, such as immigration, globalisation, climate and gay policy. The political centrist parties, the Liberals, the Social Democrats and the Greens still have 453 seats, plus 36 from the left-wing parliamentary group. Therefore, the ‘slide to the right’ hyped up by the media will not cause anything in the system to slide that would have the political weight to trigger an avalanche for a paradigm shift. Unfortunately, within the parties represented in the ID, a majority of MPs are also unlikely to mount a consistent attack in the sense of a consciously targeted desire for fundamental change.

Expectations Did Not Reach the Heavens

The case of Dr Maximilian Krah, who, as we have learned, will not be a member of the AfD group in the EU Parliament, although having been AfD’s lead candidate, is evidence of an undignified caving in to pander to Marine Le Pen and Georgia Meloni, even though these two have been able to fight over the past few months at the cost of the greatest disappointment within the based right-wing camp. Rassemblement National’s and Fratelli d’Italia’s current respectable election results do not in the slightest change anything regarding their questionable watering down of a political stance which one hoped they would adopt. Let us not forget Meloni’s failure in migration policy, or that Le Pen sharply criticised the consequent demand for remigration and that her Rassemblement National even predominantly voted in favour of enshrining the right to abortion into the French constitution. Such developments diminish the justified joy that, for example in Germany, the electorate in the youngest age cohort has moved away from the Greens. Whereas in the European elections five years ago, one in three young voters voted for the Greens, now it is ‘only’ one in ten. And although the German Social Democrats are to be heartily congratulated on their worst national election result since 1887, that should not hide the fact that — contrary to the media howls — the expectations on the right-wing spectrum did not reach the heavens, despite a few, admittedly spectacular, gains.

Congratulations to the FPÖ

The FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria) managed to become the strongest political force in Austria with 25.7% — to emphasise: without submissive distancing rituals. However, even that is not (yet) a ‘revolutionary result’. The still young ‘Hnutie Republika’ under its chairman Dr Milan Uhrik, whom I had the pleasure to interview a few years ago, also achieved a very respectable result with 12.53%. Nevertheless, one would have hoped for more from other right-wing parties, such as Vox (Spain), Chega (Portugal), the Sweden Democrats, etc. These are results that do not represent a true ‘shift to the right’. Below is a selection of election results from parties on the right, but not necessarily (ethno-)nationalist parties:

The Flemish still set a secessionist scent mark with Vlaams Belang (13.86%) and Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (13.37%), otherwise we mostly see manageable results: Vazrazhdane (14.56%), Dansk Folkeparti (6.4%), Perussuomalaiset (7.6%), La France fière (5.47%), Ellinikí Lýsi (9.3%), Lega Salvini Premier (9.04%), Domovinski pokret (8.82%), Latvija pirmajā vietā (6.16%), Nacionalinis susivienijimas (3, 79%), Konfederacja (12.08%), CHEGA (9.79%), Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor (15%), Sverigedemokraterna (13.2%), Slovenska ljudska stranka (7.23%), Vox (9.62%), SPD a Trikolora (5.73%), Mi Hazank (6.76%), Ethnikó Laikó Métopo (11.19%). La France fière, which also included ‘Reconquête!’, to which Le Pen’s niece Marion Maréchal belongs, achieved 5.47% in France alongside the RN.

Oscillating between ‘Regime Bloc Parties’

These results, at least, do not make it look like a foregone conclusion that a paradigm shift in the political situation is immediately imminent. Too many voters are still alternating between the red-green and black ‘regime bloc parties’ without realising that only the colour of the train driver’s epaulettes is changing, but not the direction of travel. The AfD is still allowing its reflexive actions to be induced too much by the media’s abusive criticism, and, further, in general too little is realised regarding the enormous influence that the changing composition of the population due to immigration has on election results. It should already be clear to those indigenous Europeans who still want to remain such that relevant majorities in terms of advocating one’s ethnic self-interest will no longer be able to organise in a society in which the autochthonous people allow themselves to become a minority. Moreover, today’s minority politics will end just as soon as ideologically induced collective ‘suicidal altruism’ has turned us Europeans into a minority in our own home countries. The straw fire of an election party no longer warms when the champagne glass is empty, and the effectiveness of the parliamentary election struggle decreases when time is demographically working against you.

Plan B: Parallel Communities

In this respect, the opposition must not lose itself in the hamster wheel of a regime and must think about a Plan B in the sense of parallel communities so that life does not punish us if we are political latecomers. The AfD often lacks a self-confident backbone in the face of campaigns by mainstream media. However, that will be necessary if they want to prove to be an ‘alternative’ in the upcoming elections in the East German federal states in autumn. Given that AfD officials cannot even rely on their own party when under media attack, the AfD should not have to rely exclusively on the centrist Party CDU. To this end, it would be good to have a regulatory framework that could serve as a political litmus test, which is ultimately not dangerous for the AfD but for the established parties. At present, this is perhaps only in sight with the so-called FREIE SACHSEN (Free Saxons) in Saxony.

Conclusion: In any case, networking, local community building, alternative media work and cultural activities in the extended political environment remain key pillars of the future strategy of nationalist activity, which, in the best-case scenario, will resonate with parliamentary initiatives. It should be clear that the political right in Europe must not lean back just because the whining of the mainstream media provides a supposedly cosy feeling of victory. At the EU level, the results of this EU election are by no means sufficient; at the very least, a few more shifts of relevant weight within the European Council are needed, for which — despite all the reasons to criticise Le Pen’s RN — the next snap elections in France could well provide a little more instability in Brussels. Nonetheless, politics preserving European ethnic well-being remains a generational task, which means that political work should not be seen as a sprint but as a marathon.